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Abstract 
My dissertation adopts analytical method to understand how firms innovate their marketing 
activities in response to the constantly changing business environment, and how such activities impact 
the behavior and wellbeing of consumers. In essay 1, I develop a profit-enhancing selling method, 
contingency selling, that is tailored to the unique features of sports events marketing, including capacity 
constraints, game uncertainty, and preference heterogeneity. I find that when the capacity constraint is 
tight, contingency selling outperforms other selling mechanisms such as traditional selling with or 
without a secondary market, spot selling, and ticket options. Essay 2 focuses on “all-or-nothing”, a 
unique feature of crowdfunding. I show that when the new product’s market potential is uncertain, the 
“all-or-nothing” feature provides double benefits to the entrepreneur. First, it safeguards the 
entrepreneur against the downside market uncertainty. Second, this safeguard enables the entrepreneur 
to take advantage of the upside uncertainty by producing products of higher quality, which are typically 
associated with higher risk. Jointly, these two effects lead to the counter-intuitive result that that 
crowdfunding allows the entrepreneur to benefit from high degree of uncertainty. 
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Introduction  
My research focuses on innovations in product development and pricing. I apply theories and 
methods from marketing and economics to phenomena and practices, where innovations are crucial, 
including sports markets and crowdfunding. In these contexts, I identify the key institutional features 
that make the context unique, and examine the impact of these features on market participants such as 
managers and consumers.  
For example, in my dissertation study on crowdfunding, I focus on “all-or-nothing”, which I 
describe as the key feature that distinguishes crowdfunding from the conventional way of funding and 
selling products. I show that this feature has considerable impact on both entrepreneurs’ strategy (essay 
1) and consumers’ collective actions (essay 2). Similarly, in a separate paper being revised for 
Management Science, I develop a profit-enhancing selling method that is tailored to the unique features 
of sports events marketing, including capacity constraints, game uncertainty, and preference 
heterogeneity. The following sections elaborate on how I implemented my research philosophy in 
various research projects. 
In essay 1, I propose a new pricing model for markets where the product is sold in advance with 
attribute uncertainty and capacity constraint. A typical example is tournament ticket sales for sports 
events where it is uncertain whether a particular team will appear in the game. The model enables the 
firm to sell tickets in a contingent fashion—i.e., some tickets will be valid only if a certain team gets 
into the game. When consumers (fans) have sufficiently different preferences for different products 
(games with different teams), selling these “contingent tickets” better matches the price with the 
willingness-to-pay of particular consumer segments (fans of specific teams). By allowing for both state-
based and belief-based price discrimination, contingent tickets generate a higher margin per seat for the 
firm than the traditional way of selling general tickets. This is especially true when the firm faces acute 
supply constraints. I further show that the proposed pricing model for advance selling continues to be 
advantageous in the presence of secondary markets where consumers purchase tickets in advance but 
can trade tickets once they know which team will be in the game. I discuss managerial implications of 
the contingency pricing model for advance selling and how it can be implemented in practice. 
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The context of my essay 2 is reward-based crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Kickstarter), which 
have become a popular choice by entrepreneurs. I examine how quality, pricing and advertising 
strategies in crowdfunded platforms differ from those in the traditional model of market entry where 
firms undertake market research; develop, produce and sell the product through a distribution channel. 
The key aspect of crowdfunding is the All-Or-Nothing (AON) feature, in which an entrepreneur does 
not produce or sell anything unless the project goal is met. This feature provides demand safeguards 
and leads to two important benefits for the entrepreneur. First, crowdfunding safeguards against poor 
market conditions. I call this effect the direct effect of crowdfunding. Second, demand safeguard allows 
the entrepreneur to advertise more, produce a higher quality, charge a higher price and make higher 
profit. I call this the indirect effect of crowdfunding. In equilibrium advertising and quality decision are 
strategic complements. In further exploring the implications of market size uncertainty, interestingly,  
my results suggest that safeguarding benefits enable the entrepreneur to receive higher profit when the 
uncertainty is higher. 
In the remainder of this dissertation, I present the two essays in sequence. The tables are 
presented in a separate chapter due to their large sizes. The Appendices at the end of the dissertation 
contain all the technical proofs for these two essays.  
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Essay 1: Service Pricing with Capacity Constraint: A Model for Sports Markets 
1. Introduction 
As multi-billion-dollar businesses, sports markets present some unique challenges to research 
and practice. Most popular sports, whether professional or college football in the U.S. or soccer 
championship games in Europe and South America, include tournament style events in which only the 
winning teams advance to the next rounds. For instance, every year only two teams play in the Rose 
Bowl of American college football or the Super Bowl of the National Football League (NFL). Two 
characteristics related to ticket selling for such events are worth noting. First, the event organizer pre-
determines the venue and sells tickets well in advance of the actual event happening (Geng et al. 2007, 
Sainam et al. 2010). A buyer, therefore, engages in advance purchase of tickets without knowing 
whether his or her favorite team will make it to the game. Thus, the valuation of the ticket is ex-ante 
uncertain and depends on the buyer’s assessment of the odds that his or her favorite team will appear in 
the game. A second issue relates to the constraint in the number of seats available. Simply put, the 
demand for seats often exceeds the service capacity of the venue. For example, when it comes to the 
Super Bowl, “we can never meet the demand for tickets,” said NFL spokesman Brian McCarthy, “If I 
could build a stadium for 1 million people I still wouldn’t have enough available tickets.” (USA Today, 
2013).1 
In this paper, I examine the problem of ticket pricing where the event organizer (thereafter 
referred to as “the firm”) engages in advance selling while facing a service capacity constraint. I propose 
a contingency selling model and assess its properties in contrast to the traditional approach. In the case 
of traditional selling, the firm sells “general” tickets that allow admission to the game, no matter which 
teams play. In the proposed contingency selling, the firm sells “contingent” tickets that are only good 
for redemption if a particular team makes it to the game. my analysis suggests that compared to 
traditional selling, contingency selling benefits the firm to a greater extent when consumer preferences 
are more heterogeneous, or the service capacity is more limited. 
                                                      
1 http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/19/super-bowl-ticket-lottery/2322955/, accessed on 7/1/2017. 
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In the sports industry, several start-ups have experimented with contingency selling. A pioneer 
was Yoonew.com, an online ticket service founded in 2004 by two MIT students. Covering games for 
the NCAA’s college basketball’s Final Four, NFL, and MLB (Major League Baseball), Yoonew sold 
ticket futures for a particular team (or a match between two particular teams), much like futures for 
stocks and goods in financial markets. If the team gets to the game, the holder of the ticket future can 
redeem it for the actual ticket. If the team does not get to the game, the ticket future becomes 
unredeemable and its value is lost. The novelty of the Yoonew business generated much enthusiasm 
and media attention. As the New York Daily News excitedly claimed, for anyone who could not obtain 
a ticket to the Super Bowl, “There’s always next year and yoonew.com.”2 
Yet, Yoonew faced two main challenges in the implementation of its selling model. First, like 
many start-ups, the company lacked trust and familiarity with consumers, which is critical when they 
need to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars in advance for a ticket. Second, being a broker itself, 
Yoonew had to purchase actual tickets from the market for redemption and, not surprisingly, often 
found it difficult to do so. It thus had to establish relationships with larger ticket brokers and season-
ticket holders to mitigate this risk. Despite these challenges, Yoonew successfully operated until 2010 
when the bank responsible for its merchant account went bankrupt amid the financial crisis, causing 
severe cash flow problems for the company. 
Nevertheless, the core idea of selling tickets contingent on future states has strong appeal and 
continues to be experimented and discussed in the industry. For example, starting August 8, 2017, 
College Football Playoff (CFP) has allowed fans nationwide to make team-based ticket reservation to 
the 2018 CFP National Championship through the website (https://cfp-rsvp.com/). 
In this paper, I formulate and formally study the properties of this new pricing method, taking 
into account three key characteristics of the market—product uncertainty, capacity constraint, and 
heterogeneous consumer preferences. It is important to point out that the contingent tickets in my 
                                                      
2 http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/giants/missing-72-dolphins-patriot-perfection-somethin-article-1.343533, 
accessed on 10/11/2017 
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pricing model are sold by the event organizer rather than by brokerage services like Yoonew. This 
directly eliminates the two challenges Yoonew faced: trust and the availability of tickets. 
We outline the idea behind contingency selling with an illustrative example. Let me consider 
the simple case of two teams, 𝐴 and 𝐵. Both teams have a chance of advancing to a future tournament 
game. The firm sells tickets for the game in advance to a total of two consumers (or segments): a fan of 
team A and a fan of team B. The fans’ valuation of the tickets depends on the value of watching their 
favorite team play and their assessment of whether the favorite team will make it to the game. For the 
ease of exposition, assume the chances that team 𝐴 and 𝐵 enter the game (call these states 𝐴 and 𝐵) are 
equal, i.e., 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵) = 0.5, and the valuation of watching the favorite team versus a less 
favorite team play is $10 versus $2. Both fans hold the correct belief about the two teams’ chance of 
entering the game. These assumptions are summarized in Table 1 on page 62. 
In traditional selling with risk neutral consumers, the firm charges $6 for a general ticket. If the 
stadium capacity for these consumers can accommodate both of them, then the firm sells to two 
consumers and makes $12. However, what happens if there is a supply side constraint? For instance, if 
the stadium can accommodate just one consumer, the revenue drops to $6 regardless of which consumer 
ends up with the ticket. Limited capacity reduces sales even though the potential demand remains at 
two. 
Now consider contingency selling. In this new approach, the firm will sell two contingent 
tickets— an “𝐴 ticket” and a “𝐵 ticket.” The A ticket will be valid if team 𝐴 advances to the game but 
will be invalid if team 𝐵 advances. Vice versa for the 𝐵 ticket. Since each consumer believes her 
favorite team has 50-50 odds to enter the game, she can pay $5 for a contingent ticket associated with 
her favorite team. Total sales are two and the firm makes $10. Notice, however, the firm is still able to 
sell two contingent tickets irrespective of whether there is a capacity constraint at one. This generates 
two observations. When there is no capacity constraint, traditional selling generates higher revenue than 
contingency selling ($12 versus $10). However, when there is a capacity constraint, contingency selling 
increases ($10 versus $6). 
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The intuition of this example lies in the fact that the consumers have different preferences for 
the two states (i.e., which team ends up playing). With traditional selling, the two states are “sold” 
together and thus indivisible from each other. 𝐴 general ticket forces consumers to pay for not only their 
preferred state but also for their less preferred state. Traditional selling essentially bundles the states 
and, depending on capacity constraint, the firm makes either $12 or $6. In contrast, contingency selling 
decouples the states and allows the firm to charge each state the price ($5) that fully extracts consumers’ 
willingness to pay for their preferred state while, at the same time, diminishes the impact of capacity 
constraint. In a nutshell, contingency selling maximizes margin per seat through “interstate price 
discrimination” when there is capacity constraint. 
In my formal model, I generalize the illustrative example and examine situations where 
contingency selling can generate higher revenue than traditional selling, and allow consumers to hold 
heterogeneous beliefs about the teams’ winning odds. In an important extension, I also account for the 
possibility that consumers can trade among themselves in the secondary market. I analyze two distinct 
pricing mechanisms in the secondary market—a neutral pricing scheme and a decentralized scheme 
using Rubinstein infinite-period bilateral bargaining. 
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the related literature 
in marketing, economics, and operations research. Section 3 develops the selling model for contingency 
selling. Section 4 incorporates a secondary market into the model. Section 5 compares contingency 
selling to alternative selling mechanisms such as spot selling. I conclude the paper with summaries and 
implications. 
2. Literature 
The proposed pricing model for advance selling is related to two streams of literature. First, my 
work contributes to the research on advance selling as a general pricing practice (e.g. Gale and Holmes 
1992; Gale and Holmes 1993; Biyalogorsky and Gerstner 2004; Biyalogorsky et al. 1999; Fay and Xie 
2010; Shugan and Xie 2000, 2005; Xie and Shugan 2001; Prasad et al. 2011; Cho and Tang 2013; Yu 
et al. 2015). The majority of these studies focus on the comparison between advance selling and spot 
selling; that is, selling tickets after the uncertainty about the desirability of the product is resolved. For 
13 
 
example, Shugan and Xie (2000; 2005) find that advance selling is profitable when the desirability of 
the product is unknown to both the seller and the buyer in advance, but known to the buyer at the time 
of consumption. Xie and Shugan (2001) show that advance selling can be a better strategy than spot 
selling when the capacity is large. Prasad et al. (2011) further show that advance selling is preferred 
only when the marginal cost of production is low. Yu et al. (2015) find that when consumers’ valuations 
of the product are highly correlated with each other, advance selling is a more profitable strategy than 
spot selling. Finally, Fay and Xie (2010) show that by offering consumers a choice with uncertainty 
(i.e., creating a probability good), advance selling can increase sales. 
Our study differs from this literature in several ways. While I consider advance selling as the 
context for both traditional selling and contingency selling, the focus of my paper is to propose 
contingency selling as a specific implementation of advance selling and show it can generate greater 
revenue for the firm. Furthermore, capacity constraint is not a central issue in much of the advance 
selling literature. However, it is a primary market condition for which I develop my contingency selling 
model. Finally, I model the impact of secondary market, which has not been considered in this literature. 
The other stream of research related to my paper includes the studies on ticket pricing and 
secondary markets. Cui et al. (2014) provide an excellent review of this literature. As they show, a key 
issue that extant studies address is whether allowing the resale of tickets (i.e., the existence of secondary 
markets) benefits or hurts the firm (e.g., Courty 2003; Möller and Watanabe 2010; Geng et al. 2007; 
Karp and Perloff 2005; Su 2010; Lim and Tang 2013). For example, Courty (2003) shows that, by 
allowing resale, a monopolistic firm can do equally well in advance selling as in spot selling. Geng et 
al. (2007) find that if there are only a small number of high valuation consumers, firms can obtain higher 
sales by allowing consumers to resell tickets before the event. Some other papers have considered the 
coexistence of regular consumers whose sole interest is to attend the event and professional scalpers 
who try to make money from the resale market (Karp and Perloff 2005; Möller and Watanabe 2010; 
Lim and Tang 2013). In contrast to these studies, my purpose is to show that, regardless of the existence 
of secondary markets, contingency selling can always benefit the firm relative to traditional selling 
when service capacity is limited. Furthermore, most extant studies do not model consumer 
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heterogeneity regarding which “state” is preferred. I take this important characteristic into consideration 
and show that the heterogeneous preference for teams plays a key role in the implementation of 
contingency selling. In addition, even though the secondary market is considered, previous research has 
not paid attention to how prices are negotiated between buyers and sellers. I analyze both a neutral 
pricing scheme and a decentralized pricing scheme, and show the optimality of traditional selling versus 
contingency selling for each scheme. 
Finally, some ticket pricing research has examined ticket options, a selling method that allows 
consumers to pay a fee for the option to buy a ticket at a later time. If the consumer wants to redeem 
the option, she needs to pay an execution fee for the ticket. In the paper by Cui et al. (2014), the authors 
first examine whether preventing the resale of tickets benefits the firm. They then link ticket options to 
resale and show that options can generate greater revenue for the firm by reducing ticket resale. They 
also show that with ticket options, the firm can benefit further if resale is prohibited altogether. These 
findings and theoretical insights are very different from ours. I demonstrate that contingency selling is 
preferred to traditional selling regardless of resale. The mechanism is that contingency selling better 
matches each seat in the capacity-constrained venue with the consumer who values it to a greater extent, 
taking into account the uncertainty about which team will be playing. 
Sainam et al. (2010) also study ticket options. They show that options are profitable when the 
firm faces both team-based consumers (i.e., consumers who gain value only if their favorite team plays 
in the game) and game-based consumers (i.e., consumers who gain value from watching any games). 
my paper differs from their study in three important ways. First, Sainam et al. (2010) do not consider 
the capacity constraint, which is an important feature of sports events that motivates my research and 
is a key feature of my model. Second, they examine the pricing of tickets that target the fans of one 
team. The model is thus applicable in managing revenue at the level of an individual team. I model 
consumer heterogeneity differently and allow different consumers to favor different teams. Such 
heterogeneity is typical of sports markets and applies to revenue management at the league level. Third, 
Sainam et al. (2010) do not consider secondary market, but I allow for the possibility of ticket resales 
and examine how it influences my results. 
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3. The Main Model  
We consider a firm and two consumer segments (1, 2), each of size 1, participating in a two-
period game. Similar to the numerical example described earlier, there are two possible states with 𝐴 
(𝐵) representing the scenario that team 𝐴 (𝐵) ends up playing in the game for which the tickets are 
being sold.3 The probability of state 𝐴 occurring is 𝜌, which is unknown in advance. I allow consumers 
to hold heterogonous beliefs about 𝜌. This not only captures the uncertainty in the market but also 
accounts for the fact that some consumers are more optimistic about their team while others are less so. 
I assume the beliefs follow the uniform distribution on [0,1]. 
Consumers in segment 1 prefer state 𝐴 over state 𝐵. Segment 2 consumers have the opposite 
preference. Consumers have a reservation value 𝑉 for their preferred state and 𝛽𝑉 for the less preferred 
state, 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1). Parameter 𝛽 is a (reversed) measure of preference heterogeneity for the states: higher 
β implies that valuations for states 𝐴 versus 𝐵 are more similar, thus less heterogeneity in preference. 
Without loss of generality, 𝑉 is normalized to be 1. 
In the first period, which state will occur is uncertain. The firm first chooses whether to sell 
general tickets under traditional selling or to sell contingent tickets under contingency selling. It then 
sets the price(s) correspondingly. Based on ticket price(s), consumers make their purchase decisions. In 
traditional selling, the firm sets a price 𝑃 for the ticket and sells a quantity of 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑄, 𝑆𝐶}, where 𝑄 is 
the potential demand and 𝑆𝐶 is service capacity. In contingency selling, the firm charges price 𝑃𝑆 for a 
contingent ticket and sells 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑄𝑆 , 𝑆𝐶} for each type of ticket, 𝑠 = 𝐴, 𝐵. In the second period, one of 
the two states occurs and ticket holders can use their tickets accordingly. Figure 1 presents the decisions 
and the game structure. 
Figure 1. Decisions and Game Sequence in the Main Model 
                                                      
3 For parsimony, our analysis focuses on one side of the tournament with two teams competing for one slot in the game. 
There are of course teams competing for the other slot. Our model considers one side but the two sides are symmetric. It can 
be shown that, given capacity constraint, contingent ticket prices do not change even when one considers both sides of the 
tournament. 
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In my main model, the firm engages in advance selling by setting prices and selling tickets 
before the uncertainty associated with the product (game) is resolved. I focus on the comparison of 
traditional selling versus contingency selling in advance selling for several reasons. Advance selling is 
the prevalent selling practice for major sports events. Tickets are often available for purchase at the 
beginning of the season, long before it is known which teams will be playing in certain games. For the 
event organizer and the sports league, advance selling generates an early revenue stream. It also 
provides a valuable revenue cushion by reducing the risk associated with less popular teams ending up 
playing the game. Moreover, advance selling is a key mechanism to engage fans early. Enthusiasm from 
the fanbase makes it not only possible but often imperative to sell tickets early. In fact, pricing and 
selling tickets after the uncertainty is resolved is viewed by many fans as unfair practice (Sainam et al. 
2010). This is an important reason why the major sports leagues engage in advance selling (Happel and 
Jennings 1995; Krueger 2001). Finally, advance selling is an effective promotional tool that generates 
awareness and interest for the event among fans and the general public. 
Therefore, my main model focuses on how contingency pricing works for advance selling when 
there is product uncertainty coupled with capacity constraint, both with and without secondary market. 
I provide several robustness checks, including the case of spot selling, in Section 5 to demonstrate that 
the advantage of my pricing model persists. 
In the analysis below, I first outline the solutions when the firm faces no capacity constraint 
and is able to offer more seats than the total demand from both segments. This is essentially the case of 
𝑆𝐶 > 2. After this benchmark case, I analyze the situation with the capacity constraint of 0 < 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 2. 
The model is extended in Section 4 to count for secondary market. 
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3.1.  No Capacity Constraint (SC > 2)  
Under traditional selling, the firm sells general tickets that are valid regardless of the true state. 
For a consumer in segment 1, her valuation for a general ticket is 𝜌 + (1 − 𝜌)𝛽. Since heterogeneous 
beliefs 𝜌  fall within [0,1] uniformly, the valuations by segment 1 consumers follow the uniform 
distribution on [β,1]. Similarly, segment 2 consumers’ valuations also follow the uniform distribution 
on [β,1]. These two consumer segments jointly generate the following aggregate demand: 
𝑄𝑇(𝑃) =
{
 
 
2, 𝑃 < 𝛽
2(1 − 𝑃)
1 − 𝛽
, 𝛽 ≤ 𝑃 < 1
0, 𝑃 ≥ 1
(1) 
Naturally, the profit function is 𝜋𝑇(𝑃) = 𝑄𝑇(𝑃). It is straightforward to show that the firm’s 
optimal price is 𝑃∗ =
1
2
 if 𝛽 <
1
2
, and 𝑃∗ = 𝛽 otherwise. The former generates a profit of 
1
2(1−𝛽)
 and the 
latter generates a profit of 2𝛽. Please refer to Table 2a on page 62 that summarizes the equilibrium price, 
quantity sold, and revenue. 
Now consider the case when the firm sells contingent tickets. Consumers’ willingness to pay 
for a contingent ticket depends on their valuations for the associated state and their beliefs about the 
probability of that state occurring. For instance, a segment 1 consumer’s valuation for ticket 𝐴 is 𝜌, 
while a segment 2 consumer’s valuation for ticket A is 𝜌𝛽. Since ρ is distributed uniformly in [0,1], 
segment 1 consumers’ valuations are uniformly distributed in [0,1], while segment 2 consumers’ 
valuations are uniformly distributed in [0, β]. Total demand is as follow: 
𝑄𝐴(𝑃𝐴) =
{
 
 2 −
1 + 𝛽
𝛽
𝑃𝐴 , 𝑃𝐴 < 𝛽
1 − 𝑃𝐴 , 𝛽 ≤ 𝑃𝐴 < 1
0, 𝑃𝐴 ≥ 1
(2) 
The corresponding profit function is 𝜋𝐴(𝑃𝐴) = 𝑄𝐴(𝑃𝐴)𝑃𝐴. The firm’s optimal price is 𝑃𝐴
∗ =
1
2
 if 
𝛽 <
1
3
, and 𝑃𝐴
∗ =
𝛽
1+𝛽
 otherwise. In a similar fashion, one can derive the optimal price for the contingent 
tickets for state B. Table 2b reports the price, quantity sold, and revenue. The comparison of firm 
revenue between traditional selling and contingency selling generates the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1.1. When the capacity is unlimited, traditional selling dominates contingency 
selling. 
The intuition behind Proposition 1.1 builds on the aforementioned differences between 
traditional and contingency selling. On the one hand, under traditional selling, the firm charges a price 
to capture consumers’ expected valuation for the event. Such a price can potentially expand demand 
because it couples the two states together so that the ticket is attractive to an average consumer. On the 
other hand, contingency selling is more effective at maximizing the margin per seat because it sells each 
contingent ticket to its high valuation segment. When the capacity is not an issue, traditional selling 
outperforms contingency selling due to its advantage in demand expansion. 
3.2.  Constrained Capacity (0 < SC ≤ 2) 
Consumer valuation of tickets, regardless of general or contingent tickets, does not change with 
respect to the capacity constraint. However, capacity constraint (SC) influences how many consumers 
can be admitted to the venue. Consider the case of traditional selling, the demand now takes the 
following form: 
𝑄(𝑃) =
{
 
 
 
 𝑆𝐶, 𝑃 < 1 −
𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽)
2
2(1 − 𝑃)
1 − 𝛽
, 1 −
𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽)
2
≤ 𝑃 < 1
0, 𝑃 ≥ 1
(3) 
When SC is smaller than 
1
1−𝛽
, the firm’s best strategy is to charge 𝑃 = 1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
, selling 
up to its full capacity SC for a revenue of 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
). When 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
1−𝛽
, the firm sells to 
1
1−𝛽
 
consumers by pricing at 1/2. The revenue is 
1
2(1−𝛽)
. A similar analysis can be done for contingency 
selling. Please refer to Table 3 on page 63 and Table 4 on page 64 for the results. The Appendices 
contain the derivations of the results in Table 3 and 4 and all other technical results. The comparison 
generates the following finding: 
Proposition 1.2a. With capacity constraint, contingency (traditional) selling generates higher 
revenue if 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  (𝑆𝐶 ≥ 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ ). 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  equals 
1−√𝛽
1−𝛽
 for 𝛽 < ?̅? ≈ 0.420 and 
2(3𝛽−1)
−1+4𝛽+𝛽2
 otherwise. 
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In contrast to Section 3.1, capacity constraint is a key issue and contingency selling becomes 
optimal when 𝑆𝐶 is low. To see this result, consider the low capacity case (𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
). As shown in Table 
3, with traditional selling, the maximum price the firm is able to charge is 1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
. At this price, 
𝑆𝐶
2
 
of the segment 1 consumers and 
𝑆𝐶
2
 of the segment 2 consumers get served. However, with contingency 
selling (Table 4), the firm sells the 𝐴 ticket at a price of max {1 − 𝑆𝐶,
𝛽(2−𝑆𝐶)
1+𝛽
} to 𝑆𝐶 consumers. Also, 
it sells the same number of 𝐵 tickets at the same price to 𝑆𝐶 consumers. Altogether, the firm is able to 
charge a price of max {2 − 2𝑆𝐶,
2𝛽(2−𝑆𝐶)
1+𝛽
} for each available seat. Therefore, by issuing contingent 
tickets, the firm sells the same number of seats to both consumer segments and, in turn, earns a higher 
margin per seat than traditional selling, i.e., max {2 − 2𝑆𝐶,
2𝛽(2−𝑆𝐶)
1+𝛽
} > 1 > 1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
. 
When supply constraint is less of an issue, however, traditional selling turns out to be the better 
strategy. Consider the case when SC is close to 2. The optimal price and sales for traditional and 
contingency selling are close to the no capacity constraint case. 
These results indicate that contingency selling benefits the firm by allowing it to extract greater 
margin per seat when it faces the capacity constraint. This is achieved by decoupling the states so that 
each segment of consumers buys the contingent ticket corresponding to its preferred state. More 
critically, however, by decoupling the states, the firm is able to sell the available seats to both segments 
of consumers. This strategy is more effective when the capacity becomes more limited. 
As shown in Appendices, the threshold 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  is a function of 𝛽, i.e., the heterogeneity in consumer 
preference. Proposition 1.2b summarizes how 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  is affected by 𝛽: 
Proposition 1.2b. When consumer preference heterogeneity is high (𝛽 ≤ ?̅?), 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  is decreasing 
in 𝛽. When consumer preference heterogeneity is low (𝛽 > ?̅?), 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  is increasing in 𝛽. 
The proof is included in the Appendices. Proposition 1.2b shows the nuanced impact of 
consumer preference heterogeneity: the region of 𝑆𝐶  over which contingency selling outperforms 
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traditional selling is first decreasing and then increasing in 𝛽. To understand this non-monotonicity, it 
is useful to examine the different impacts of 𝛽 on the two selling mechanisms. 
When consumer preference heterogeneity is high (i.e., 𝛽 is small), under contingency selling, 
the firm sells contingent tickets of each state only to the consumer segment who values the state. In the 
example of an 𝐴 ticket, the firm sells it only to the fans of team 𝐴. With small 𝛽, fans of the other team 
are not lucrative enough for the firm to target. Therefore, a marginal increase in 𝛽 does not influence 
the firm’s revenue. However, under traditional selling, since the two states are bundled together, a 
marginal increase in 𝛽 enhances every consumer’s valuation for the general ticket and, in turn, increases 
the revenue. Thus, at low values of 𝛽, a marginal increase in 𝛽 boosts the revenue for traditional selling 
but not for contingency selling. As a result, the range of SC over which contingency selling dominates 
traditional selling shrinks. 
However, when 𝛽 is large, the difference in valuations between a consumer’s preferred and less 
preferred states becomes smaller. Under both selling mechanisms, the firm ends up selling tickets of 
each state to serve consumers of both segments. When this happens, the effect of 𝛽 is moderated by the 
belief parameter 𝜌. Consider the case of 𝐴 tickets under contingency selling. The firm sells 𝐴 tickets 
not only to segment 1 consumers (𝐴 fans) but also to segment 2 consumers (𝐵 fans) whose 𝜌 is high. 
Recall that segment 1 consumers’ valuation for ticket 𝐴 is 𝜌, while segment 2 consumers’ valuation is 
𝜌𝛽. Thus, a marginal increase in 𝛽 enhances segment 2 consumers’ valuation by 𝜌 but it does not 
influence segment 1 consumers, and the effect of 𝛽 occurs only among segment 2 consumers whose 𝜌 
is high. Similarly, for 𝐵 tickets, a marginal increase in 𝛽 boosts the valuation of segment 1 consumers 
by 1 − 𝜌 but it does not influence segment 2 consumers. The effect of 𝛽 occurs among segment 1 
consumers who have high 1 − 𝜌, or equivalently low 𝜌. 
In the case of traditional selling, the valuation for the general ticket is 𝜌 + (1 −  𝜌)𝛽  for 
segment 1 consumers and 𝜌𝛽 + 1 − 𝜌 for segment 2 consumers. A marginal increase in 𝛽 increases the 
valuation of segment 1 consumers by 1 − 𝜌 and segment 2 consumers by 𝜌. Due to the capacity 
constraint, the firm only serves segment 1 consumers whose 𝜌 is high and segment 2 consumers whose 
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𝜌 is low since they value the general ticket to a greater extent than others. In other words, the effect of 
𝛽 works through the segment 1 consumers whose 𝜌 is high and the segment 2 consumers whose 𝜌 is 
low. 
It is therefore clear that, when 𝛽 is high, under both selling mechanisms, the marginal effect of 
𝛽 is 1 − 𝜌 for segment 1 and 𝜌 for segment 2. However, what kinds of consumers are the base for the 
marginal effects differ between the two mechanisms. 
Let me look at segment 1 consumers first. Under contingency selling, an increase in 𝛽 helps 
enhance firm revenue through affecting segment 1 consumers’ valuation of B tickets and, as shown 
above, this enhancement only occurs on those with low 𝜌 (thus 1 − 𝜌 is high). Under traditional selling, 
however, an increase in 𝛽 helps increase revenue through segment 1 consumers whose 𝜌 is high (thus 
1 − 𝜌 is low). Thus, based on segment 1 consumers, the magnitude of the marginal effect of 𝛽, i.e., 1 −
𝜌, is higher under contingency selling than under traditional selling. Similarly, based on segment 2 
consumers, the marginal effect of 𝛽 is also stronger under contingency selling than under traditional 
selling.  
Taken together, considering both segments, a marginal increase in 𝛽 amplifies the advantages 
of contingency selling over traditional selling. This explains an increasing 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  when 𝛽 is large. 
Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 suggests that the efficacy of interstate price discrimination through 
contingency selling is moderated by two market primitives—consumer preference heterogeneity 𝛽 and 
service capacity 𝑆𝐶. While 𝛽 has a non-monotonic impact on the comparison between contingency and 
traditional selling, lower 𝑆𝐶 always improves the efficacy of contingency selling as fully extracting the 
rent from each seat becomes more valuable. 
4. Secondary Market 
We now consider a more general framework wherein customers can trade tickets with each 
other in the second period (Figure 2). At this point, which team is playing in the game becomes known 
to the public. Consumers who hold tickets can resell if their favorite team does not make it to the game 
and those who do not have a ticket can buy if their favorite team makes it to the game. Trading in 
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secondary markets among consumers is common in some sports markets. According to Technavio 
(2015), the value of the secondary ticket market in 2015 was $8.94 billion, 54.73% of which came from 
sports tickets. The revenue of StubHub, the world’s largest ticket resale website, has grown from $100 
million in 2006 to $725 million in 2015. 
Figure 2. Decisions and Game Sequence with Secondary Market 
In the secondary market, some consumers become buyers if they do not currently own a ticket 
and they are willing to pay as much as 1 to acquire the ticket. At the same time, some consumers become 
sellers if they hold tickets but their preferred state did not occur. They are willing to sell their tickets 
for anything above 𝛽. I use upper case 𝑃 to represent the price set by the firm in the first period and 
lower case 𝑝 to denote the resale price in the secondary market which, as I outline below, is negotiated 
between potential buyers and sellers. Whether a consumer becomes a buyer or seller in the secondary 
period depends on whether she gets a ticket in the first period. I assume the following rationing rule: 
when the demand exceeds the capacity (𝑄 > 𝑆𝐶) in the first period, all potential buyers who find the 
price acceptable have an equal chance to get the ticket. When 𝑥 consumers from segment 1 and 𝑦 
consumers from segment 2 are willing to buy a ticket, then 
𝑥
𝑥+𝑦
𝑆𝐶 tickets go to segment 1 and 
𝑦
𝑥+𝑦
𝑆𝐶 
tickets go to segment 2. The firm does not participate in the secondary market.4 
When making purchase decisions in the first period, consumers are aware that there will be a 
secondary market. The impact of a secondary market on consumers’ decision making is thus twofold. 
On the one hand, the existence of a secondary market can push consumers to “buy now” since they have 
                                                      
4 Anecdotally, the assumption that the firm does not participate in the secondary market is supported by the fact that sports 
leagues, such as the NFL, do not buy back and resell tickets that they have already sold, although they do not preclude 
consumers from directly participating in trades through secondary markets such as StubHub.com. From a technical 
standpoint, this assumption helps keep the model parsimonious so that the impact of the secondary market on contingency 
selling can be parsed out more clearly. 
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the opportunity to resell later if their preferred state is not realized. On the other hand, a secondary 
market also reduces the motivation of advance purchase since it is possible to wait to buy a ticket from 
the secondary market. In other words, the presence of a secondary market may motivate consumers to 
“buy later.” Whether a customer buys now or buys later depends on both the ticket price set by the firm 
and the price she expects in the secondary market. The firm needs to consider these consumer decisions 
when it sets the ticket price in the first period. Thus, the first step is to model how the resale price in the 
secondary market is determined. 
In principle, any price between buyers’ and sellers’ valuations of the ticket can clear the 
secondary market. The actual price, however, depends on how they agree to split up the surplus 
generated from the trade. I examine two different scenarios that capture the fundamental processes of 
the secondary market. In subsection 4.1, I analyze the neutral price situation wherein the buyer and 
seller meet halfway between their valuations. The even split could arise due to balanced powers between 
buyers and sellers. In subsection 4.2, I analyze a process where buyers and sellers randomly match with 
each other and negotiate a resale price through pairwise bargaining. The matching and bargaining 
iteration goes on until at least one side of the market (buyer or seller) clears (Binmore and Herrero 1988; 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1990). This pricing mechanism is akin to consumers trading in an electronic 
marketplace such as Craigslist. 
For each scenario, I first analyze traditional ticket selling and then contingency selling. I look 
for equilibrium where consumers’ decisions are consistent with their beliefs. For explosion ease, I focus 
on the case of constrained capacity due to its practical and the analytical insight it provides. 
Unconstrained capacity can be analyzed in a straightforward manner as a special case where 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 2. 
4.1.  Neutral Price 
Under traditional selling, a potential buyer values a general ticket in the secondary market at 1 
while a potential seller values it at 𝛽, regardless of the realized state. That means any price between 𝛽 
and 1 will clear the secondary market, making all potential buyers and sellers willing to trade at such a 
price. If the market clears so that buyers and sellers eventually obtain equal surplus from resale, the 
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price will be 𝑝 =
1 + 𝛽
2
.5 The surplus a buyer gains is 1 −
1 + 𝛽
2
=
1 − 𝛽
2
, while a seller gains 
1 + 𝛽
2
− 𝛽 =
1 − 𝛽
2
. 
Under contingency selling a ticket only has resale value in its corresponding state. For instance, 
if state 𝐵 is realized, then 𝐴 tickets have no resale value but a 𝐵 ticket has the same resale value as a 
general ticket. Thus, the neutral resale price for a contingent ticket in its corresponding state is 
1 + 𝛽
2
. 
Tables 5 and 6 on page 65 outline the optimal prices and the corresponding sales for traditional ticket 
selling and contingency selling, respectively. 
How does the existence of a secondary market impact the prices under the two selling 
mechanisms? Let me first look at traditional selling. Recall that the secondary market strengthens the 
motivations for both “buy now” and “buy later.” For any given resale price 𝑝, the existence of the 
secondary market strengthens the “buy now” effect by increasing consumers’ valuation for their less 
preferred state from 𝛽 to 𝑝. At the same time, it strengthens the “buy later” effect by increasing the 
value of “buy later” from 0 to 1 − 𝑝. With the neutral resale price, the resale price takes the middle 
value between 𝛽 and 1, allowing the “buy now” and “buy later” effects to cancel out each other. Thus, 
for traditional selling, the optimal price is not influenced by the secondary market. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3, where the curves for firm revenues with and without the secondary market overlap in the left 
panel. 
                                                      
5 Notice that this price is akin to a mediator, or a centralized platform, choosing the price 𝑝 that maximizes the joint surplus, 
(𝑝 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝑝), of potential buyers and sellers. The optimal price is 𝑝 =
1 + 𝛽
2
. Thus, the neutral price model captures the 
essence of a mediator and provides a useful benchmark that incorporates the dynamics in the secondary market before I 
model a more nuanced negotiation mechanism in the next subsection. 
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Figure 3. Impact of Secondary Market with Neutral Resale Price on Firm Revenue 
 
In contrast, the right panel of Figure 3 shows the situation of contingency selling. When 𝑆𝐶 is 
low, the firm charges the same price (𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝐵 = 1 − 𝑆𝐶) as in the main model. All contingent tickets 
go to the consumer segment that values the corresponding state the most. If this turns out to be the true 
state, those consumers will keep their tickets. Otherwise, the tickets have no resale value. In either case, 
no resale occurs. Thus, with contingency selling, the secondary market does not influence firm strategy 
when 𝑆𝐶 is low. 
When capacity is high, recall that the firm would sell contingent tickets for each state to both 
consumer segments. For instance, ticket 𝐴 is priced such that both segments 1 and 2 consumers buy it. 
The price is determined by segment 2 consumers’ willingness to pay because they are the low valuation 
segment. With a secondary market, segment 2 consumers have an additional motivation to buy simply 
because they can resell the tickets to segment 1 at a price higher than the value they would receive from 
watching the game in state 𝐴 (i.e., 
1+𝛽
2
> 𝛽). This enhanced motivation to “buy now” for segment 2 
consumers allows the firm to charge a higher price for contingent tickets relative to the main model. As 
a result, the revenue is also increased. Proposition 1.3 summarizes the comparison between traditional 
selling and contingency selling when the secondary market exists with neutral price: 
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Proposition 1.3. With neutral price being the resale price, contingency selling always generates 
higher revenue than traditional selling when 𝛽 < √5 − 2 . When 𝛽 ≥ √5 − 2 , contingency selling 
generates higher revenue than traditional selling if 𝑆𝐶 <
4−√2(−1+3𝛽+5𝛽2+𝛽3)
4−4𝛽
. 
Proposition 1.3 shows that the key result from the main model still holds in the presence of the 
secondary market. That is, contingency selling outperforms traditional selling when the capacity 
constraint is tight. Moreover, when 𝛽 low, contingency selling is preferred at any capacity levels. 
Note that when the secondary market exist, contingency selling outperforms traditional selling 
for a larger range of market conditions. Specifically, the threshold below which contingency selling is 
preferred is 𝑆𝐶 =
4−√2(−1+3𝛽+5𝛽2+𝛽3)
4−4𝛽
, which is higher than the threshold 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  in the main model. The 
increased dominance of contingency selling vis-à-vis traditional selling comes from the respective 
impacts of the secondary market on the two selling mechanisms. As discussed earlier, when 𝑆𝐶 is low, 
the existence of the secondary market does not change the firm’s revenue for either traditional selling 
or contingency selling. When 𝑆𝐶 is high, however, the secondary market improves the revenue for 
contingency selling but not for traditional selling. Taken together, the existence of secondary market 
enlarges the advantage of contingency selling. 
4.2.  Rubinstein Negotiation Price 
We now analyze a different mechanism for how the resale price in the secondary market is 
determined. I model a resale process in which sellers post their tickets for sale and engage in price 
negotiation with interested buyers. Such a process is common in online trading platforms such as 
Craigslist and eBay. 
Rubinstein infinite-period (round) bilateral bargaining is one of the most well-known models 
for the process and the equilibrium of buyer-seller negotiations (Gale 1987; Binmore and Herrero 1988; 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1990; Osborne and Rubinstein 1990). The game has two parts – matching and 
bargaining. Each round starts with a match between an individual on one side of the market (either 
buyer or seller) and at most another individual on the other. The probability of a given individual 
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matching with someone is determined by the sizes of the buyer and seller markets. Let me denote 𝐵𝑡 as 
the number of active buyers and 𝑆𝑡 as the number of active sellers at the beginning of round 𝑡. If the 
numbers of participants on both sides are the same (𝐵𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡), then each participant will be able to match 
with someone from the other side. If the numbers of participants are different, say there are more sellers 
than buyers (𝐵𝑡 < 𝑆𝑡), then a seller can enter a match with probability 
𝐵𝑡
𝑆𝑡
 and a buyer enters a match 
with probability 1. Similarly, the probability will be 1 for sellers and 
𝑆𝑡
𝐵𝑡
 for buyers if there more buyers 
than sellers (𝐵𝑡 > 𝑆𝑡). 
Bargaining then happens between each matched pair of buyer and seller. If they reach an 
agreement, the transaction will be conducted at the price level defined by Nash bargaining, and the pair 
leaves the secondary market. If no agreement is reached, both individuals remain active in the market 
for the next round. The game ends when either side has no individual remaining active in the game. 
Both buyers and sellers want to find a match and complete the trade sooner than later. Specifically, for 
every extra round that an individual stays active, her surplus will be discounted by 1 − 𝛾, where 𝛾 ∈
(0, 1) represents consumer patience in the bargaining process. Larger 𝛾 implies more patient consumers. 
The equilibrium is a combination of a price function 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) and value functions 𝑉𝑠(𝑆, 𝐵) and 
𝑉𝐵(𝑆, 𝐵) for any 𝑆, 𝐵 ≥ 0. The price function assigns a price to each pair of matched buyer and seller 
given the active numbers of sellers (𝑆) and buyers (𝐵). The value functions define the maximum 
expected surplus for sellers and buyers respectively. In equilibrium, the price function will be such that 
all the matched sellers and buyers are willing to accept the equilibrium price whenever they are matched. 
The equilibrium price and valuations will depend on the bargaining power of the buyers versus the 
sellers, which in turn depends on the size of each segment. The equilibrium under this model 
formulation is summarized in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, all matched pairs reach an agreement in the first round of bargaining 
with an agreed resale price. The equilibrium resale price is 𝑝 =
1+(1−𝛾)𝛽
2−𝛾
 for 𝑆 < 𝐵, 𝑝 =
1+𝛽
2
 for 𝑆 = 𝐵, 
and 𝑝 =
1−𝛾+𝛽
2−𝛾
 for 𝑆 > 𝐵. 
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Lemma 1 is a modified version of the classic result in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, Chapter 
6). It shows that the resale price reached through bilateral bargaining depends on the relative bargaining 
power of buyers versus sellers. When there are equal numbers of sellers and buyers, the resale price is 
the neutral price that was analyzed in the previous section. When there are unequal numbers of sellers 
and buyers, the resale price depends on which side of the market has more participants: the price is 
lower (higher) if there are more (less) sellers than buyers. Since a higher resale price means more surplus 
for sellers and less surplus for buyers, Lemma 1 is consistent with the notion that the short side of the 
secondary market (i.e., the side with relatively fewer participants) has more power in the bargaining 
process than the long side. 
Furthermore, the division of transaction surplus depends on consumers’ patience (𝛾) in the 
bargaining process. When consumers are more patient (i.e., 𝛾 is higher), sellers and buyers are more 
willing to leave their matched partner and stay for extra rounds of matching and negotiation. However, 
not achieving an agreement has different consequences on the two sides of the market. An individual 
on the short side knows that she will have a high chance of finding a match in the next round of 
negotiations. On the contrary, an individual on the long side knows it can be very difficult for her to 
enter a new match if she leaves the current match. In other words, the long side of the market is simply 
more eager to find a match in the current round than the short side. Technically, higher patience benefits 
the short side more than it does the long side and leads to a more asymmetric division of surplus in 
favor of the short side. 
Based on Lemma 1, I solve for the firm’s optimal pricing strategy under traditional selling and 
contingency selling. Tables 7 and 8 on page 66-68 provide the results with proofs detailed in Appendices. 
Different from previous sections, consumer patience γ plays a role in determining the firm’s prices and 
revenues. 
We first discuss the effect of patience on the pricing. Under traditional selling, the impact of 𝛾 
on revenue depends on the value of 𝑆𝐶 (illustrated in the left panel of Figure 4). When capacity is 
relatively low, 𝑆𝐶 < 1, only a limited number of consumers will get tickets in the first period. Thus, 
there will be more buyers than sellers in the secondary market. Since higher consumer patience 
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increases resale price (𝑝) when there are more buyers than sellers, the potentially higher resale price 
enables the firm to increase the price (𝑃) in the first period and earn higher revenue. The opposite holds 
true when the capacity is high, i.e., 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 1. A higher 𝛾 results in a lower resale price, which drives the 
firm to charge a lower price in period 1 to attract more buyers early and thus earn less revenue. 
Figure 4. Impact of Consumer Patience on Firm Revenue 
Under contingency selling (Table 8), similar to the case of neutral resale price, resale does not 
happen if capacity is sufficiently small, i.e., when 𝑆𝐶 <
1−𝛽−𝛾+𝛽𝛾
2−𝛾
. When 𝑆𝐶 is in the intermediate 
region (
1−𝛽−𝛾+𝛽𝛾
2−𝛾
≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
2(2−𝛾)
), the firm serves both segments and sells contingent tickets up to 
its capacity. When 𝑆𝐶 is high (𝑆𝐶 ≥
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
2(2−𝛾)
), the firm’s optimal strategy is not bounded by the 
capacity constraint. It sells as much as 
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
2(2−𝛾)
 contingent tickets. Note that this amount is smaller 
than 1, so there will always be fewer sellers than buyers in the secondary market. Thus, higher consumer 
patience increases the resale prices of contingent tickets and in turn drives the firm to charge higher 
prices in the first period. To summarize, higher 𝛾 does not change the performance of contingency 
selling for low 𝑆𝐶 and increases it for high 𝑆𝐶. These can be observed from the plots in the right panel 
of Figure 4. Proposition 1.4 summarizes the comparison between the two selling mechanisms.  
Proposition 1.4. With bilateral bargaining and Rubinstein negotiation price in the secondary 
market, contingency selling always generates higher revenue than traditional selling if 𝛽 < √5 − 2 or 
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𝛾 ≥ ?̂?. If 𝛽 ≥ √5 − 2 and 𝛾 < ?̂?, contingency selling (traditional selling) generates higher revenue if 
𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆?̂? (𝑆𝐶 ≥ 𝑆?̂?), where 𝑆?̂? =
−2+(2−𝛽)𝛾+√
1−𝛽3(1−𝛾)3+𝛽2(−5+11𝛾−9𝛾2+2𝛾3)−𝛽(3+7𝛾−15𝛾2+5𝛾3)+5𝛾−9𝛾2+3𝛾3
−2+𝛾
2(−1+𝛽+𝛾−𝛽𝛾)
. 
Proposition 1.4 shows that my key results continue to hold: contingency selling is advantageous 
when capacity is more limited (i.e., smaller SC), or consumer preferences are heterogeneous (i.e., 
smaller β). 
How does consumer patience affect the benefit of contingency selling? The capacity threshold 
𝑆?̂?  increases in 𝛾 . That is, higher consumer patience makes it easier for contingency selling to 
outperform traditional selling. The threshold 𝑆?̂? is in the high 𝑆𝐶 region (𝑆𝐶 > 1). Recall that, in this 
region, higher consumer patience increases the revenue in contingency selling but decreases that in 
traditional selling. Therefore, higher consumer patience makes it more likely that contingency selling 
dominates traditional selling. 
In summary, the analysis in Section 4 shows that the core advantage of contingency selling over 
traditional selling holds in the presence of secondary markets and for different pricing mechanisms of 
the resale price. The secondary market generates an important trade-off for consumer motivations in 
terms of “buy now” versus “buy later.” The existence of a secondary market does not necessarily 
improve the profitability of traditional selling because it enhances both motivations. Yet, contingency 
selling enables the firm to strike the balance better to improve profitability. As a result, the secondary 
market can enlarge the advantage of contingency selling over traditional selling. 
5. Comparison with Other Selling Mechanisms 
The focus of my paper is to examine the properties of contingency selling as a pricing model 
for advance selling. Thus, the most relevant alternative is the traditional selling method that sells general 
tickets in advance. The previous sections show that contingency selling outperforms traditional selling 
in some very common market conditions where the capacity is limited, and consumers have 
heterogeneous preferences. 
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In this section, I compare contingency selling with three other selling mechanisms, spot selling, 
advance selling with the possibility of full refund, and selling tickets as options, to further demonstrate 
its effectiveness. Since the main results of the paper get carried over to secondary markets, I exclude 
ticket resale from the analysis here. 
In spot selling, the firm sells tickets after the true state is realized. If, for example, state 𝐴 is 
realized, the firm can sell to segment 1 only (i.e., the high valuation segment) by charging a price 𝑃 =
1, or to both segments by pricing at 𝛽. When 𝑆𝐶 is smaller than 1, the firm’s best targeting strategy is 
always to target segment 1 since it is impossible to serve both. The firm can sell up to its full capacity 
𝑆𝐶 for a revenue of 𝑆𝐶. When 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 1, however, the firm has two options. If it sells to segment 1 by 
pricing at 1, it will sell one ticket and make 1 in revenue. If it prices the ticket at 𝛽 and sells to both 
segments up to capacity 𝑆𝐶, the revenue will be 𝑆𝐶𝛽. Table 9 on page 69 summarizes the firm’s optimal 
price and revenue under the two states. 
Proposition 1.5 summarizes the comparison of revenues based on Table 2b and Table 9: 
Proposition 1.5. When 𝛽 <
1
2
, contingency selling (spot selling) generates higher revenue if 
𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
 (𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
2
). When 𝛽 ≥
1
2
, contingency selling (spot selling) generates higher revenue if 𝑆𝐶 <
3
2
−
1
2𝛽
 (𝑆𝐶 ≥
3
2
−
1
2𝛽
). 
Contingency selling outperforms spot selling with low 𝑆𝐶 , even though both selling 
mechanisms enable the firm to conduct inter-state price discrimination, i.e., tailoring the price of each 
state to its corresponding high valuation segment. What makes contingency selling superior is that it 
also enables the firm to take advantage of consumer heterogeneity in beliefs (captured by parameter 𝜌) 
in addition to the heterogeneity in preferences. When the firm sells tickets on the spot, the uncertainty 
has already been resolved. Thus, all consumers within each segment will have the same valuation for 
the ticket. With low 𝑆𝐶, the firm charges 𝑃 = 1 and sells the tickets to fans whose preferred state is 
realized. Such price generates a margin of 1. When the firm sells contingent tickets in advance, however, 
it is unclear which team will be playing in the game. Due to heterogeneous beliefs, consumers assess a 
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contingent ticket at different values: a more optimistic consumer would value a contingent ticket higher 
than a pessimistic consumer. Thus, through belief-based price discrimination, contingency selling 
enables the firm to charge a price that only optimistic consumers are willing to pay. For both 𝐴 and 𝐵 
tickets, the firm charges a price greater than 
1
2
, and the total margin is higher than 1. 
Proposition 1.5 also shows that the capacity threshold under which contingency selling 
outperforms spot selling is (weakly) increasing in 𝛽. The underlying reason is the different effects of 𝛽 
on the two selling mechanisms. In contingency selling, higher 𝛽 enables the firm to sell contingent 
tickets to serve consumers of both segments. The higher 𝛽, the higher price the firm charges. However, 
under spot selling, the value of 𝛽 has no impact on revenue as long as 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 1 since the firm only sells 
to the high valuation segment. Thus higher 𝛽 enlarges the advantage of contingency selling over spot 
selling. 
Next, I examine advance selling with the possibility for full refund. Under this mechanism, the 
firm sells tickets in advance with uncertainty but, after the uncertainty is resolved, a consumer who has 
bought a ticket can choose to opt out and get fully refunded. In this sense, all consumers are willing to 
purchase the ticket so long as the price matches their valuation for their preferred state. When 𝑃 ≤ 𝛽, 
all the consumers are willing to purchase the ticket and will not opt for refund. When 𝛽 < 𝑃 ≤ 1, all 
the consumers are willing to purchase the ticket but those whose preferred state is not realized will opt 
out to be refunded. Therefore, the optimal price for the firm to charge is either 𝛽 or 1. The demand is 2 
if 𝑃 = 𝛽 and 1 if 𝑃 = 1. Note that this demand function is the same as that under spot selling. Since 
some consumers will eventually opt out under ticketing with refund, the revenue cannot be higher than 
that in spot selling revenue. Thus, contingency selling’s advantage over spot selling continues to hold 
for advance selling with the possibility for full refund. 
Finally, I consider consumer option and employ the specific mechanism proposed by Sainam 
et al. (2010) to model option pricing. Specifically, the firm sets two prices, an option price 𝑃𝑂 and an 
exercise price 𝑃𝐸 . The option is offered when the true state is uncertain and consumers can purchase the 
option by paying the option price. After the true state is realized, consumers who hold the option can 
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exercise the option by paying the exercise price. One immediate observation is that 𝑃𝑂 + 𝑃𝐸  cannot be 
greater than 1. Otherwise, no consumer will purchase the option in the first stage because the total cost 
of watching the game exceeds their valuation even in their preferred state. Thus, the margin per seat 
cannot be higher than 1. This fact leads to the conclusion that, when the capacity constraint is binding, 
the revenue under consumer option cannot exceed that under spot selling. Therefore, the contingency 
selling’s advantage over spot selling still applies to consumer option. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I propose the idea of contingency selling in the context of sports markets where 
consumers face uncertainty about the product and there is service capacity constraint. I examine its 
properties in comparison with the traditional approach of selling tickets and show that contingency 
selling is able to extract (higher) rent for each seat through interstate price discrimination. By 
decoupling different states, contingency selling enables the firm to sell each state to the right kind of 
consumers, i.e., the consumers who have a stronger preference for a particular team and/or have a 
stronger belief in the team’s chance of advancing to the game. Contingent tickets essentially enable the 
firm to sell every single seat to multiple consumers. This effect becomes more pronounced when service 
capacity is more limited. 
In terms of theoretical contribution, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that 
formally examines the merits (and limitation) of contingency selling, an idea that has been experimented 
with in the industry. my model integrates the literature on advance selling and ticket pricing by 
considering the impacts of product uncertainty, capacity constraints, and consumer heterogeneity, as 
well as secondary markets and the different price mechanisms for resale. 
Our model provides valuable guidance on the nascent practice of contingency selling for sports 
leagues and event organizers. my study points out the revenue benefit of viewing each seat in a venue 
as generating different values for different consumers, depending on the alignment between a 
consumer’s preference for teams and which team is playing in the game. The contingent ticket approach 
that I propose can decouple different values so the right consumer purchases the seat for the right event, 
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revenue can be enhanced. This gain becomes larger when the venue has a service capacity constraint 
because the opportunity to match the seat with the right consumer becomes more critical. 
In practice, the contingency selling model I proposed is straightforward to implement. The firm 
needs to know consumers’ preferences to watch their favorite teams play (𝑉) and their preference 
discount to watch other teams (𝛽). As suggested in Sainam et al. (2010), these estimates can be gleaned 
by hosting a Vickrey-type auction (second-price sealed-bid auction) among representative consumers. 
Alternatively, fans can be surveyed directly for their preferences. 
Note that 𝑉 is required to implement either traditional selling or contingency selling. However, 
while the firm must know 𝛽 to effectively practice traditional selling, it only needs β for contingency 
selling when service capacity is high. When capacity is limited, which is the situation for contingency 
selling to be more effective than traditional selling, the firm does not need to estimate 𝛽 to implement 
contingency selling. This is because contingency selling enables the firm to price different states 
separately and when capacity is low, the firm prices each state to accommodate only one consumer 
segment. Knowing consumers’ preferences for their favorite teams is sufficient. Thus, implementing 
contingency selling does not burden the firm with additional information acquisition. 
We end the paper with two potential venues for future research. First, in modeling the secondary 
market, I focus on the neutral price scenario, which can be achieved by equal-powered buyers and 
sellers, and the bilateral negotiation scenario, which is common in marketplaces such as Craigslist. 
Another scenario to consider is when the firm can actively participate in the secondary market. It is then 
possible to explore how contingency selling may change with dynamic pricing, that is, the firm setting 
one price in advance selling and another in the spot market. 
Second, it will be interesting to further examine the properties of contingency pricing when 
more nuanced consumer situations are assumed. For instance, fans may be risk-averse when making 
decisions under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), or fans of different teams may have 
different amounts of enthusiasm for watching their favorite teams playing. These situations can be 
captured by enriching the consumer characteristics assumptions in this model.  
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Essay 2. Marketing Mix in Reward-based Crowdfunding 
1. Introduction 
“I could make a much cheaper work, but part of the appeal of Kickstarter and crowdfunded 
projects is to make something of higher quality than I could without having the capital there at 
the beginning.”6 
-----Wolfgang Baur, founder of over 25 crowdfunding projects 
 
In recent years, reward-based crowdfunding through platforms such as Kickstarter and 
Indiegogo has become an increasingly popular approach for entrepreneurs to launch new products.7 In 
2018 the worldwide transaction value in reward-based crowdfunding had amounted to 9.4 billion US 
dollars and is expected to continue growing at an annual rate of 29%. 8  Through reward-based 
crowdfunding, entrepreneurs seek funding to support the production of a wide variety of products such 
as postcards, handbags, electronic devices, household items, music albums, movies, and so on. The 
mechanics of how a reward based crowdfunding platform works can be seen from a simple illustrative 
example of a Kickstarter-based crowdfunding campaign (see Figure 5 below). To start a crowdfunding 
campaign, entrepreneurs need to post information such as the description of the project (including price), 
the funding goal, the funding period, and the reward for the funders through platforms such as 
Kickstarter.com. Typically, the reward takes the form of the product funders invest in. The project 
information posted by entrepreneurs is visible to funders who are registered on the crowdfunding 
platform. Based on the information they see, funders decide whether to fund a project or not. When 
funders pledge support to the project they authorize the payment in case the funding goal is met. 
However, the payment is not actually rendered until the project goal is met.  
                                                      
6 For source, see https://www.backerkit.com/blog/stretch-goals-pros-and-cons/, accessed on 09/18/2018. 
7 The other types of crowdfunding include donation-based, lending-based, and equity-based crowdfunding. Compared with 
these other types, award-based crowdfunding is unique in that it directly allows the entrepreneur to promote a new product 
idea and seek funding to support the production of the new product. See Burtch et al. 2013; Cumming and Johan 2013; 
Mollick 2014 for more details on different crowdfunding types. my paper focuses on reward-based crowdfunding. 
8 For source, see https://www.statista.com/outlook/335/100/crowdfunding/worldwide, accessed on 07/18/2018. 
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Figure 5. The project “Gentle Cards” on Kickstarter 
Therefore, if within the funding period, the total amount of money raised for a project reaches 
its funding goal, funders’ payment gets rendered and the entrepreneur gets all the funds to start 
producing the product. The funders will receive their rewards once the products get produced. On the 
other hand, if the funding goal is not met, the funders do not get charged. Thus, crowdfunding follows 
the “All or Nothing” (AON) model, which is the dominant approach to crowdfunding (Mollick 2014).9 
Under crowdfunding, a funder (buyer) pays for the new product before it is produced. 
Given the mechanics of the crowdfunding an important distinction between the crowdfunding 
model and the traditional approach of market entry is worth noting. With traditional market entry, 
entrepreneurs or firms rely on debt or equity financing to fund the business operations. Prior to that they 
rely on their judgment or use market research to access market potential, make requisite investment, 
produce the product and then sell it to potential consumers. More specifically, with traditional market 
entry, the entrepreneur often time relies on sales forecast generated from market research 
(Neelamegham and Chintagunta 1999). However, market research can often times be unreliable for 
multiple reasons. Due to issues such as the limitation in sampling and the reliance on consumer 
perception rather than actual purchase, does not always provide an accurate picture of the actual 
                                                      
9 The other approach is called “Keeping it All”, under which the fundraiser keeps all the money she/he collects regardless 
whether it reaches the funding goal or not. 
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demand.10 Moreover, prior research has shown that historical data and past performance, often utilized 
in market research, can be poor predictors of market conditions post launch (Hitsch 2006, Luan and 
Sudhir 2010). On the contrary, in crowdfunding, due to the AON feature demand is demonstrated before 
the entrepreneur enters the production cycle. For this reason, crowdfunding has the potential to mitigate 
the impact of market uncertainty. In other words, because of the AON feature, market uncertainty is 
resolved ex-ante. By seeking funding support from the crowd, crowdfunding taps into actual consumer 
purchase through the reward offered in exchange for funding before a project starts. As a result, 
crowdfunding has the potential to protect the entrepreneur against the situation where the demand for 
the new product is low.  
In this paper using a model where a monopolist entrepreneur facing a market with uncertain 
demand. I hone in on the AON feature to analyze marketing strategies associated with reward-based 
crowdfunding. In particular, this paper answers the following research questions. How does the 
entrepreneur or firm behave differently in product quality and pricing decisions if it enters the market 
through crowdfunding rather than the traditional approach? What are the implications for advertising 
that firms utilize to inform potential consumers? What are some of the welfare implications of using 
reward-based crowdfunding platforms? How does the degree of market uncertainty affect these 
decisions? Answers to these questions not only enrich my understanding of crowdfunding for 
managerial purposes, but also generate useful insights for consumer welfare and public policy regarding 
crowdfunding as a new business model. It also complements the existing literature on crowdfunding 
and decision making in markets with uncertain demand.  
The key insights from my analysis are as follows. First, quite intuitively, the all-or-nothing 
feature of crowdfunding platform safeguards the entrepreneur against poor market conditions: if there 
are not enough consumers who like the product, the funding target cannot be reached, and the 
entrepreneur does not receive any funding nor produce anything. This safeguarding effect is a direct 
benefit of crowdfunding. Second, because of the direct benefit, the entrepreneur in crowdfunding is able 
                                                      
10 For the source, see https://smallbusiness.chron.com/disadvantages-market-research-new-product-development-
23441.html, accessed on 07/19/2018. 
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to advertise more which directly boosts the effective demand that the entrepreneur faces. Moreover, the 
demand safeguards increases the equilibrium product quality. In a market with heterogeneous 
preference for quality, the entrepreneur is also able to charge a higher price in equilibrium. Increase in 
quality has a dual effect. On one hand, increase in quality may decrease the probability that the 
crowdfunding project will be successful. That happens because, a higher quality product costs 
commensurately more to produce. As a result, the funding goal required for the project to be successful 
also increases. Higher funding goal decreases the probability of a success. However, on the other hand, 
increase in quality also ensures that if the project is successful, the entrepreneur will be able to extract 
a higher revenue from a secured group of consumers (funders). Ex–ante due to the demand safeguard 
the latter effect prevails and the entrepreneur is able to make higher profits in equilibrium. Equilibrium 
profit is also boosted by increased advertising in equilibrium. Increase in profit due to higher levels of 
advertising, quality and price is the indirect benefit due of safeguarding. Both the direct and indirect 
benefits come from the unique feature of crowdfunding and provide important implications for 
entrepreneurs and policymakers. I test the robustness of my core findings through extensions. In the 
first extension I outline the effect of marginal changes in overall uncertainty in the market. my main 
finding in this section is – increased uncertainty also increases the optimality of crowdfunding platform 
because the entrepreneur makes higher profit as uncertainty increases. In other words, the efficacy of 
crowdfunding vis-à-vis traditional method of selling increases in a more volatile market. In a more 
volatile market, demand is more on the extremes – very low or very high. Demand safeguards associated 
with crowdfunding allows the firm to focus more on high demand which motivates the entrepreneur to 
increase advertising and quality provision in equilibrium. Expected profit also increases as a result. In 
another extension I allow the possibility that consumers’ willingness to pay in crowdfunding and 
traditional markets are different. While confirming core findings of the paper, I also show that an 
entrepreneur can expect to make higher profit through a crowdfunded market even when the average 
willingness to pay for a product bought from the crowdfunding platform is lower than willingness to 
pay for a product acquired through traditional channel. In other words, my results suggest that under 
proper market conditions, the benefits of crowdfunding prevail even when traditional market entry 
possess ex-ante advantages in turn lending support to my core results.  
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The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related 
literature in marketing, economics, and entrepreneurship. In Section 3, I develop the base model for the 
crowdfunding context. Section 4 compares an entrepreneur’s product and pricing strategies in 
crowdfunding vs. the traditional entry scenario. Section 5 generalizes the model to count for the role of 
informative advertising as well as welfare implication. In Section 6 provide some viable extension of 
the core model. Finally, I conclude the paper with summary and implications. The Appendices provide 
necessary technical details.  
2. Related Literature 
An emerging literature highlight the multitude of benefits accrued by firms choosing to launch 
and sell products on a crowdfunding platform. For example, two recent papers argue that crowdfunding 
provides firms the possibility of price discrimination. Belleflamme et al. (2013) point out that one key 
value of reward-based crowdfunding is that it enables the entrepreneur to price discriminate between 
people who pledge early and pledge late. More closely to this work is a recent work by Hu et al. (2015). 
They examine entrepreneurs’ marketing strategy - pricing and product line - in the crowdfunding 
context. They find that crowdfunding enables entrepreneurs to engage in price discrimination by 
offering a menu of prices. The high valuation buyers are willing to pay the higher price on the menu to 
increase the project’s chance of meeting the funding goal even if a lower price is also available on the 
menu. They further analyze the entrepreneur’s product line decision and find that crowdfunding leads 
to less differentiation within the product line. In this paper, the entrepreneur’s benefit from 
crowdfunding persists without price discrimination. The primary source of advantage derives from 
safeguarding benefits of the AON feature associated with crowdfunding which allows the entrepreneur 
to provide a higher quality product and advertise more.  
A key benefit of crowdfunding is that crowdfunding provides information about market 
conditions. Chemla and Tinn (2018) show that crowdfunding enables firms to learn about consumer 
preferences based on the contribution of the crowd. This learning benefits the firms regardless of 
whether they achieve the funding goal. Mollick and Nanda (2016) validate the revelation value of 
crowdfunding empirically with Kickstarter data. Viotto da Cruz (2018) find that, among the projects 
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that fail to meet their funding goals, those who receive more positive feedback are more likely to be 
released in the market. Roma et al. (2018) show that entrepreneurs can utilize the success of 
crowdfunding campaign as a signal of good market potential to convince venture capitalists to invest in 
their projects. However, none of the above papers examine how crowdfunding’s value in revealing 
market conditions impacts marketing strategies (e.g., product quality, price, and advertising), which is 
the primary objective of this paper. Therefore, this paper complements the existing literature by 
delineating the spillover effect on crowdfunding on some of the marketing mix elements. 
This paper is fundamentally about the mechanism through which crowdfunding deals with 
uncertain demand. Therefore, this work is related to the literature on marketing decisions under 
uncertainty. Demand uncertainty is a key topic in the literature of marketing and economics (Horowitz 
1970, Dehez and Jacquemin 1975, Harris and Raviv 1981, Jagpal and Brick 1982, Carlton and Dana 
2008). The effort at developing marketing tools to resolve demand uncertainty at least goes back to 
Fourt and Woodlock (1960). On the one hand, various market forecasting tools have been developed 
over time to predict the market response to new products (Bass 1969, Urban and Katz 1983, Hitsch 
2006, Luan and Sudhir 2010). These techniques, although useful in many situations, are limited in 
eliminating demand uncertainty completely. The application of these techniques relies crucially on the 
availability of sales data of similar or analogous products. For new products with innovative features, 
such data are often hard to get. It is often inevitable for entrepreneurs and new startups to live and deal 
with uncertainty. 
Some studies have analyzed different mechanisms that help firms to deal with demand 
uncertainty. Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg (2014) examine the scenario where a firm introduces a 
sequence of new products. They show that when the degree of uncertainty is high, the firm will 
introduce a low-quality product initially and postpone the quality decision of the second product until 
the market condition is realized. Similarly, Che et al. (2010) point out that backorder, another form of 
postponement, can be adopted to tackle high demand uncertainty. Outlining the immediate benefits 
from crowdfunding to deal with market level uncertainty, in this paper, I dig deeper by parametrizing 
the degree of uncertainty and providing insights in to how marginal changes in the degree of uncertainty 
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impacts the entrepreneur’s profit in traditional vis-à-vis crowdfunded markets. my results suggest that 
increased uncertainty benefits firms. Akin to this result, Alexandrov (2015) also demonstrates that 
greater uncertainty (risk) may result in higher firm profit. However, the higher profit occurs only when 
the firm is able to adjust its marketing decisions (e.g., price) after the uncertainty is resolved. Syam et 
al. (2016) show a similar result in the sales management context; both the sales manager and the 
salesperson can benefit from higher sales uncertainty when the salesperson is able to acquire 
information about the realized market condition and adapt his effort based on such information. 
However, the results of both studies rely on the assumption that decision-makers are able to adjust their 
decisions after the uncertainty is resolved. my analysis shows that even without the possibility of 
adjusting marketing mix after uncertainty is resolved, the firm, in a crowdfunding market, may still 
derive higher profit as uncertainty increases. 
3. Model Setup 
We start by analyzing quality and pricing strategies in crowdfunding versus traditional market 
entry. I then model the advertising decision and its interaction with other marketing variables. Finally, 
I examine crowdfunding’s implication on consumer (funder) surplus. 
Our model formulation is akin to Carlton and Dana (2008). The market consists of a mass of 
𝑀 consumers. Each consumer is represented by her distinctive quality preference 𝜃 that follows the 
uniform distribution over [0,1]. For a consumer 𝑖, her willingness to pay for a product of quality 𝑆 is 
𝜃𝑖𝑆. If I denote the price of the product as 𝑃, a consumer 𝑖’s net utility from purchasing the product is 
𝜃𝑖𝑆 − 𝑃. A consumer’s utility is zero if she does not purchase the product. For any given quality-price 
pair (𝑆, 𝑃), consumers with 𝜃 ≥
𝑃
𝑆
 will purchase the product. In other words, the entrepreneur faces a 
downward slope demand function 𝐷(𝑃) = 𝑀 (1 −
𝑃
𝑆
). 
To capture the market uncertainty, I assume the market size 𝑀, which represents the market 
potential of the entrepreneur’s project, is unknown to the entrepreneur before he or she enters the market. 
The entrepreneur only knows that 𝑀  follows a uniform distribution over the range [0,1] . If the 
entrepreneur launches the production, she invests 𝐶(𝑆) to deliver a product of quality 𝑆. I assume a 
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convex cost of quality provision, 𝐶(𝑆) =
𝑆2
2
 (Mussa and Rosen 1978). Following the literature, I assume 
that the entrepreneur chooses the quality first and then the price (Moorthy 1984, Villas-Boas 1998, 
Lahiri and Dey 2013). 
There are two critical assumptions that are worth noting. First, the distribution of consumer 
preference 𝜃 is the same in the traditional and the crowdfunding markets. Such an assumption may 
seem tenuous since one can claim that consumers with different preferences visit the two retailing 
platforms and therefore the distribution assumption on 𝜃 should be different as well. Second, one may 
also contend that the market size 𝑀 that an entrepreneur expects to face is different in a traditional and 
crowdfunding markets. Indeed, it may be the case that potential mass of customers is larger in a 
traditional retailing platform. In the extension section 6 I address both the assumptions and show that 
the core results of the model hold given boundary market conditions.  
 The sequence of the game in both the traditional and crowdfunding market entry is outlined in 
Figures 6(a) and 6(b). In the traditional market entry, the entrepreneur decides on the quality of the 
product in Stage 1. In Stage 2, given quality, the entrepreneur decides on the price. Finally, in Stage 3, 
consumers make buying decision given the price and quality. A key difference between the two market-
entry models is the time when the entrepreneur undertakes the cost to initiate production. In case of 
crowdfunding, entrepreneur takes action to produce only when the funding goal is met. Such is the 
AON feature that provides a safeguard to the entrepreneur. This is not true for the traditional way of 
starting a business—even though one can use market research to gauge market demand, actual reactions 
from real buyers will not be observed until the product is produced and sold through the retail channel.  
Figure 6. Move Sequence in the Two Entry Models 
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(a) Traditional Entry    (b) Crowdfunding 
Given the demand function 𝐷(𝑃) = 𝑀 (1 −
𝑃
𝑆
), the optimal price given quality 𝑆 is 𝑃∗ =
𝑆
2
 in 
both traditional and crowdfunding scenarios. In the following discussion, I outline the entrepreneur’s 
equilibrium quality and pricing decisions under the two entry models – traditional and crowdfunding. I 
start with a simpler model with only quality and price decision (and no informative ads) in section 4. 
That allows me to delineate the two part effect of crowdfunding more clearly. Subsequently, in section 
5 I consider the full model which reflects the core effects but also adds nuances that comes through 
endogenizing advertising. 
4. Analysis 
4.1.  Benchmark Result with Fixed Quality  
In order to understand optimal marketing strategy in the traditional and crowdfunding models, 
I first look at the entrepreneur’s price decisions and expected profits for a fixed quality level 𝑆̅. The 
reason why it is useful to first analyze the market with fixed 𝑆̅ is because the indirect effect from 
crowdfunding emanates from endogenizing quality. Therefore, fixed quality allows me to quantify the 
direct effect. 
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Suppose that the product quality is 𝑆̅ in both the traditional entry scenario and crowdfunding. 
In the traditional entry scenario, the entrepreneur chooses price 𝑃𝑇  and incurs the production cost 
𝑆̅2
2
 
before the uncertainty is resolved. Depending on the realized market size 𝑀, her profit is 𝜋𝑇(𝑆̅, 𝑃𝑇) =
𝑀 (1 −
𝑃𝑇
𝑆̅
) 𝑃𝑇 −
𝑆̅2
2
. Given the aforementioned equilibrium price 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
𝑆̅
2
, I can rewrite the profit 
function as 𝜋𝑇
∗ (𝑆̅) =
𝑀𝑆̅
4
−
𝑆̅2
2
. Since 𝑀 follows the uniform distribution over [0,1], the entrepreneur’s 
expected profit is 𝐸[𝜋𝑇
∗ (𝑆̅)] =
𝑆̅
8
−
𝑆̅2
2
.  
In the crowdfunding scenario, the entrepreneur launches the production only if the amount of 
raised funds meets the funding goal. If the funding goal is not reached, funders get their money back, 
and the entrepreneur does not enter the market. Thus, her profit is 𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆̅
) 𝑃𝐶 −
𝑆̅2
2
 if 
𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆̅
) 𝑃𝐶 ≥ 𝐺 and zero otherwise. By substituting the optimal price 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
𝑆̅
2
, I can summarize the 
entrepreneur’s profit as follows: 
𝜋𝐶(𝑆̅, 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺) = {
1
4
𝑀𝑆̅ −
𝑆̅2
2
,
1
4
𝑀𝑆̅ ≥ 𝐺
0,
1
4
𝑀𝑆̅ < 𝐺
(4) 
Since 𝑀 follows [0,1] uniform distribution, the probability for 
𝑀𝑆̅
4
≥ 𝐺 to be true is 1 −
4𝐺
𝑆̅
. The 
entrepreneur’s expected profit can be written as: 
𝜋𝐶[𝜋𝐶(𝑆̅, 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺)] = (1 −
4𝐺
𝑆̅
)∫ (
1
4
𝑀𝑆̅ −
𝑆̅2
2
) 𝑑𝑀
1
4𝐺
𝑆̅
=
1
2
(1 −
4𝐺
𝑆̅
) (4𝐺 + 𝑆̅ −
𝑆̅2
4
) (5) 
We take the first order derivative of the profit expectation with respect to the funding goal 
𝑑𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆̅,𝑃𝐶,𝐺)]
𝑑𝐺
= 2𝑆̅ −
4𝐺
𝑆̅
 and obtain 𝐺∗ =
𝑆̅2
2
. I observe that the optimal funding goal equals to the cost 
of production. The intuition is: 𝐺  represents the minimum funding needed for the crowdfunding 
campaign to succeed. The lower 𝐺  is, the larger the chance that the crowdfunding campaign is 
successful. The entrepreneur wants to increase the chance as long as she makes a non-negative profit. 
That means the entrepreneur wants to set 𝐺  as low as possible given that she can break even. The 
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minimal income that the entrepreneur needed to break even is the production cost 
𝑆̅2
2
. Thus, the optimal 
funding goal 𝐺 is the production cost 
𝑆̅2
2
.  
Substituting 𝐺∗ =
𝑆̅2
2
, the profit expectation in crowdfunding market is: 
𝐸[𝜋𝐶
∗(𝑆̅)] =
𝑆̅
8
−
𝑆̅2
2
+
𝑆̅3
2
(6) 
Simply put, safeguarding allows the entrepreneur to earn an extra profit of 
𝑆̅3
2
 in the 
crowdfunding market (𝐸[𝜋𝐶
∗(𝑆̅)] − 𝐸[𝜋𝑇
∗ (𝑆̅)] =
𝑆̅3
2
). The term 
𝑆̅3
2
 captures the enhanced profit due to 
safeguarding. Since it manifests for any given quality level, I call this the direct effect of safeguarding 
in crowdfunding. Moreover, the direct effect of safeguarding is increasing in the product quality 𝑆̅. 
Higher quality is associated with a higher cost. When the cost is higher, the entrepreneur is more worried 
about wasting such cost in a poor market condition (small demand). In turn, safeguarding is more 
valuable. Next, I consider the entrepreneur’s optimal strategy with endogenous quality. 
4.2.  Endogenous Quality  
If the entrepreneur enters the market through the traditional channel, she chooses a quality level 
𝑆𝑇  to maximize the expected profit. 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝑆𝑇)] =
𝑆𝑇
8
−
𝑆𝑇
2
2
. It turns out that the profit-maximizing 
quality is 𝑆𝑇
∗ =
1
8
. The expected profit becomes 
1
128
. If, instead, the entrepreneur launches her product 
through crowdfunding, she sets quality 𝑆𝐶  to maximize the expected profit 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆𝐶)] =
𝑆𝐶
8
−
𝑆𝐶
2
2
+
𝑆𝐶
3
2
. 
It can be verified that the optimal quality is 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
1
6
. The entrepreneur earns a profit expectation of 
1
108
. 
This result is summarized in the following proposition, whose proof is presented in Appendix 15.  
Proposition 2.1. The product quality, as well as the price, is higher if the entrepreneur enters 
the market through crowdfunding rather than through the traditional approach. The expected profit is 
also higher through crowdfunding. 
46 
 
Proposition 2.1 allows me to see the second (indirect) effect of crowdfunding on the 
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s expected profit is 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝑆𝑇)] =
𝑆𝑇
8
−
𝑆𝑇
2
2
 in the traditional market 
entry scenario and 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆𝐶)] =
𝑆𝐶
8
−
𝑆𝐶
2
2
+
𝑆𝐶
3
2
 in crowdfunding. Apart from the direct safeguarding 
effect measured by the last term of 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆𝐶)], the indirect effect of crowdfunding is realized because 
𝑆𝐶
∗ > 𝑆𝑇
∗ , which also makes the total of the first two terms in 𝐸[𝜋𝐶]  larger than 𝐸[𝜋𝑇]. Thus, the 
entrepreneur benefits from crowdfunding through the enhanced product quality in addition to the direct 
effect through safeguarding.  
The intuition behind this second-tier benefit lies in greater quality provision in a crowdfunded 
market. A higher quality product allows the entrepreneur to charge a higher price and extract more 
revenue from the market. A caveat however is in order. Choosing a higher level of quality comes with 
two countervailing forces. On one hand, higher quality enables the entrepreneur to earn a higher per-
unit margin. On the other hand, delivering higher quality is also commensurately costlier because of the 
convex cost of quality. However, demand safeguarding ensures that the former effect prevails. To see 
this, notice in crowdfunding, higher quality implies that the ex-ante probability of successfully meeting 
the funding goal is lower. This is because, in equilibrium, the probability of a successful project is 
Pr (𝑀 > 2𝑆𝐶) = (1 − 2𝑆𝐶 ) which is a decreasing function of 𝑆𝐶 .  However, the all-or-nothing feature 
of crowdfunding safeguards the entrepreneur against poor market conditions (i.e., small market size). 
Thus, the entrepreneur is relatively less concerned about the situation where the market size is too small 
to cover the production cost. Instead, the entrepreneur can focus on the market size conditional on the 
project being successful which is given by 𝐸[𝑀|𝑀 > 2𝑆𝐶] =
1
2
+ 𝑆𝐶  and it is increasing in 𝑆𝐶 . This 
increases the incentive to optimally increase quality. Higher quality enables the entrepreneur to charge 
a higher price in crowdfunding because equilibrium price takes the form of 
𝑆𝐶
2
. Taken together, with a 
higher quality product sold at a higher price the entrepreneur derives higher profit. On the other hand, 
in the traditional market, the entrepreneur makes the quality decision based on the expected market size. 
In the absence of demand safeguards, the entrepreneur considers the convex cost of quality which in 
turn forces the entrepreneur to choose a lower level of quality. Given the above dynamic outlining the 
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rationale behind higher quality provision with crowdfunding, I move on to the full model considering 
entrepreneur’s’ optimal advertising decision along with the other marketing mix variables. 
5. Full Model with Informative Advertising 
One implicit assumption so far is that all the consumers in the market are aware of the new 
product. Yet, in neither traditional market entry nor crowdfunding will consumers automatically 
become informed of new products. Often, entrepreneurs need to inform consumers of new products 
through advertising. In fact, many successful crowdfunding projects are accompanied by well-crafted 
marketing campaigns, often with the help from professional agencies (e.g., Enventys Partners).11 As 
Roy Morejon, president of Enventys Partners, once stated, “Running a crowdfunding project is not the 
sort of thing where you set it up, launch, and then come back 30 days later to collect your money.”12 
Such marketing campaigns usually take the form of promotion on social media and happen prior to the 
launch of crowdfunding projects. It is generally recommended by industry experts that promotions take 
place 1-3 months in advance of the launch of a crowdfunding project.13 In this section, I extend the base 
model to analyze the entrepreneur’s equilibrium advertising strategy by modeling promotions as 
entrepreneurs’ posting informative ads to raise awareness of its products (Grossman and Shapiro 1984). 
Of particular importance is to outline how equilibrium advertising strategy interacts with equilibrium 
quality decisions.  
To account for the advertising decision, I add an additional stage (Stage 0) to the beginning of 
the model. Initially, no consumer is aware of the new product. Consumers become aware of the new 
project via the entrepreneur’s informative advertising. To inform 𝐾 ∈ [0,1]  portion of the market 
population, the entrepreneur needs to spend expenditure 𝑎𝑑(𝐾) =
𝐾3
24
 on advertising. I chose this 
particular functional form for two reasons. First, it guarantees the existence of closed form solutions. 
Second, it is consistent with the literature on informative advertising where the cost of advertising is 
                                                      
11 Zack Miller, 2018, “A List of the Best PR Firms for Crowdfunding,” https://www.thebalancesmb.com/a-list-of-the-best-
pr-firms-for-crowdfunding-985173, accessed on 08/29/2018. 
12 Gillian Terzis, 2017, “Do Paid Ads in Crowdfunding Pay?” https://www.backerkit.com/blog/does-paid-advertising-in-
crowdfunding-pay, accessed on 08/29/2018. 
13 For the source, see https://enventyspartners.com/blog/facebook-advertising-and-your-crowdfunding-project/, accessed on 
08/29/2018. 
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assumed to be continuous, increasing, and convex. The last assumption reflects the notion that it is 
increasingly expensive to reach additional consumers as the informed population gets larger.  
In the following I focus on the firms advertising decision primarily because advertising is the 
added variable in this formulation. The dynamics behind equilibrium quality provision and price remain 
the same. Moreover, to better understand the equilibrium advertising strategy, akin to last section, I first 
analyze the entrepreneur’s choice of equilibrium advertising as a function of the given quality level 𝑆̅. 
Moving from fixed to endogenous quality helps me dual objectives. First, as in the base model, it helps 
to tease apart the direct effect of crowdfunding. Second, it helps to clearly delineate the complementary 
or mutually reinforcing nature of equilibrium advertising and quality decisions. The latter is critical in 
fully characterizing the nature of the indirect effect in this model. 
With traditional entry, the entrepreneur first chooses the advertising level 𝐾𝑇 and incurs the 
cost 
𝐾𝑇
3
24
. Then, she decides on price. Given the advertising level 𝐾𝑇, the entrepreneur’s profit function 
is 𝜋𝑇(𝑆̅, 𝐾𝑇 , 𝑃𝑇) = 𝐾𝑇𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝑇
𝑆̅
) 𝑃𝑇 −
𝑆̅2
2
−
𝐾𝑇
3
24
. Similar to the previous scenario, the optimal price 
given quality is 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
𝑆̅
2
. Thus, the expected profit can be written as 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝑆̅, 𝐾𝑇)] =
𝐾𝑇𝑆̅
8
−
𝑆̅2
2
−
𝐾𝑇
3
24
. 
If the entrepreneur launches her product through crowdfunding, she first chooses advertising 
level 𝐾𝐶  by spending 
𝐾𝐶
3
24
 in stage 0. Then she sets the price 𝑃𝐶  and the funding goal 𝐺 to set up the 
crowdfunding campaign in stage 2. In stage 3, consumers choose whether to fund the entrepreneur at 
the posted price 𝑃𝐶 . The entrepreneur’s profit as a function of the advertising level 𝐾𝐶  is  
𝜋𝐶(𝑆̅, 𝐾𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝐾𝐶𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆̅
) 𝑃 −
𝑆̅2
2
−
𝐾𝐶
3
24
, 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆̅
) 𝑃𝐶 ≥ 𝐺
−
𝐾𝐶
3
24
, 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆̅
) 𝑃𝐶 < 𝐺
(7) 
We obtain the optimal price and funding goal. Since 𝑀 follows the uniform distribution over 
[0,1], the expected profit takes the following form 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝐾𝐶)] =
1
8𝐾𝐶
(𝐾𝐶 − 2𝑆̅)
2𝑆̅ −
𝐾𝐶
3
24
. 
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Before, I go onto discuss optimal advertising strategy for a fixed quality I outline the direct 
effect of safeguarding in a crowdfunding platform. The direct effect of safeguarding accrues without 
endogenizing the advertising and quality decision. For a fixed advertising (𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 = 𝐾) and quality 
one can see that 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝐾)] > 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝐾)] and 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝐾)] − 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝐾)] = 4𝑠
3, where the latter expression 
is the magnitude of direct effect. In other words, as one would expect the direct effect still persists in 
the full model. 
Now coming back to the advertising decision for a fixed quality, the optimal level of advertising 
under traditional and crowdfunding market are given by: 
𝐾𝑇
∗(𝑆̅) = √𝑆̅ (8) 
𝐾𝐶
∗(𝑆̅) = √
1
2
𝑆̅ (1 + √1 − 16𝑆̅) (9) 
The critical observation is that both 𝐾𝑇(𝑆̅) and 𝐾𝐶(𝑆̅)  are increasing in 𝑆̅. This is because 
higher quality enables the entrepreneur to charge a higher price and extract higher revenue from the 
informed consumers. Thus, with higher product quality, it is more valuable for the entrepreneur to spend 
on informing consumers. Second, also note that 𝐾𝑇(𝑆̅) > 𝐾𝐶(𝑆̅): for a given quality 𝑆̅, the entrepreneur 
advertises less in the crowdfunding market than in the traditional market. Because of the all-or-nothing 
feature of crowdfunding, there is a chance for the entrepreneur to receive nothing (funding failure) in 
crowdfunding. That means the advertising spending will be wasted with a certain probability. The risk 
of funding failure deters the entrepreneur from spending more money on advertising. 
Now consider the case when quality is endogenous: the entrepreneur makes the quality decision 
in the second stage after investing in advertising. Under traditional entry, in the second stage, the 
entrepreneur takes the advertising level 𝐾𝑇 as given and sets quality 𝑆𝑇 to maximize her expected profit 
𝐾𝑇𝑆𝑇
8
−
𝑆𝑇
2
2
−
𝐾𝑇
3
24
. I obtain optimal decision variables as: is 𝐾𝑇
∗ =
1
8
 , 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
1
64
, 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
1
128
, and 𝐸[𝜋𝑇
∗ ] =
1
24576
. In the crowdfunding case, the optimal decision variables are 𝐾𝐶
∗ =
4
27
, 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
2
81
, 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
1
81
, and 
𝐸[𝜋𝐶
∗] =
16
59049
. 
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By simply comparing the optimal advertising levels in the two scenarios, I obtain Proposition 
2.2, whose proof is contained in Appendix 17. 
Proposition 2.2. The equilibrium advertising spending and quality are higher in the 
crowdfunding compared with that in the traditional market entry scenario. The expected profit is also 
higher through crowdfunding. 
The equilibrium choice of advertising and quality is the source of indirect benefit from 
crowdfunding. First note that, 𝐾𝐶
∗ > 𝐾𝑇
∗ . In other words, with endogenous quality, the entrepreneur posts 
more ads when selling through a crowdfunded market relative to a traditional market. This contrasts 
with the result outlined in the model with exogenous quality where I noted 𝐾𝑇(𝑆̅) > 𝐾𝐶(𝑆̅) - the 
entrepreneur posted less informative ads when selling through a crowdfunded market than in a 
traditional market. Of course, equilibrium quality is also higher in line with the result in the previous 
section.  
The intuition behind the result lies in the complementarity between the entrepreneur’s quality 
and advertising strategies. In the model with endogenous quality, quality is set after advertising decision 
is being made. Therefore, one can compute the quality choice as a function of advertising which are 
𝑆𝑇
∗(𝐾𝑇) =
𝐾𝑇
8
 and 𝑆𝐶
∗(𝐾𝐶) =
𝐾𝐶
6
 . Notice both are increasing functions of advertising decisions, 𝐾𝑇 and 
𝐾𝐶 . That is higher levels of advertising allows the entrepreneur to increase quality in equilibrium. 
Advertising is informative and hence is demand generating. Therefore, increasing advertising intensity 
also bolsters the entrepreneur’s incentive to increase quality because a higher quality product (sold at a 
higher price) helps the entrepreneur extract more revenue from a larger addressable market. However, 
choice of higher quality, in turn makes the entrepreneur choose higher levels of informative ads in 
equilibrium. That is because, with higher product quality, it is more valuable for the entrepreneur to 
spend on informing consumers. As I saw before, both 𝐾𝑇(𝑆̅) and 𝐾𝐶(𝑆̅) are increasing in 𝑆.̅ Technically, 
if the entrepreneur knows that she will produce a higher quality product at Stage 2 of the game, it 
motivates her to advertise more in the Stage 0 so as to raise demand for the high quality product. Put 
differently, the complementarity goes as follows: Higher advertising increases the incentive to produce 
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a higher quality product because a higher quality product allows greater revenue extraction. A higher 
quality product, in turn, raises the incentive to increase informative advertising in equilibrium because 
more informative advertising expands demand. This complementarity in choosing equilibrium 
advertising and quality increases profit. Now due to demand safeguards both advertising and quality 
choice and higher in the crowdfunding platform relative to traditional selling. Higher quality and 
advertising is at the heart of the indirect benefit from crowdfunding.  
In summary, the core benefit from the demand safeguard with crowdfunding comprises of the 
direct effect and the indirect effect. The direct accrues because in crowdfunding the entrepreneur do not 
operate if the market condition is demonstrably poor. The indirect effect accrues through entrepreneur’s 
choice of marketing mix elements (advertising, quality and price). It is affected by the aforementioned 
direct effect and also the complementarity between advertising and quality choice. Taken together, 
demand safeguards in crowdfunding platform can deliver offers higher profit to the entrepreneur than 
in the traditional channel.  
Consumer (Funder) Surplus 
Our analysis so far has shown that crowdfunding encourages entrepreneurs to produce more 
innovative products by providing a safeguard against uncertainty. For crowdfunding platforms such as 
Kickstarter or Indiegogo, the success of their business lies in serving both entrepreneurs and consumers 
where the consumers are also the funders. As Indiegogo once stated, “Indiegogo regularly develops and 
tests new features to meet the needs of both funders and campaign owners.”14 Therefore, it is imperative 
to consider not only the entrepreneur’s profit but also the funders backing the entrepreneur. In this 
Section, I discuss results concerning consumer or the funder surplus.  
In the traditional entry scenario, consumer surplus is  
𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑇(𝐾𝑇 , 𝑆𝑇 , 𝑃𝑇)] = ∫ ∫ 𝐾𝑇𝑀(𝜃𝑆𝑇 − 𝑃𝑇)𝑑𝜃
1
𝑃𝑇
𝑆𝑇
𝑑𝑀
1
0
(10) 
                                                      
14 Jon Russell, 2014, “Indiegogo Is Testing Optional Insurance Fees for Crowdfunded Products”, 
https://techcrunch.com/2014/12/01/indiegogo-is-testing-optional-insurance-fees-for-crowdfunded-products/?ncid=rss. 
Accessed on 05/18/2018. 
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In the crowdfunding scenario, however, the consumer surplus is zero if the campaign fails to 
meet the funding goal. Only if the campaign is successfully funded, the consumer surplus takes the 
positive value 𝐾𝑀∫ (𝜃𝑆 − 𝑃)𝑑𝜃
1
𝑃
𝑆
. Let ?̃? =
𝑆𝐶𝐺
𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝐶−𝑃𝐶)
 be the smallest market size that enables the 
campaign to be succeed. The consumer surplus is defined as follows. 
𝐶𝑆𝐶(𝐾𝐶, 𝑆𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺, 𝑀) = {
0, 𝑀 < ?̃?
𝐾𝐶𝑀∫ (𝜃𝑆𝐶 − 𝑃𝐶)𝑑𝜃
1
𝑃𝐶
𝑆𝐶
, 𝑀 ≥ ?̃? (11) 
The ex-ante expected consumer surplus takes the following form. 
𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝐶(𝐾𝐶, 𝑆𝐶, 𝑃𝐶, 𝐺)] = ∫ ∫ 𝐾𝐶𝑀(𝜃𝑆𝐶 −𝑃𝐶)𝑑𝜃
1
𝑃𝐶
𝑆𝐶
𝑑𝑀
1
?̃?
(12) 
Given the above definitions, I compare the consumer surplus across the two market entry 
strategies. By substituting the entrepreneur’s optimal quality, price, and advertising levels into the 
equation (10) and (12), I obtain Proposition 2.3. 
Proposition 2.3. The expected consumer surplus is higher in crowdfunding. 
The proof is presented in Appendix 18. The intuition behind the Proposition is driven by the 
fact that the aggregate consumer surplus comes from consumers who have a higher preference for 
quality (higher 𝜃) - only consumers with higher (𝜃 >
𝑃
𝑆
) buy the product. That also implies that higher 
the equilibrium quality, higher is the consumer surplus. Indeed, in the previous section I noted that in 
equilibrium quality is higher in a crowdfunding platform than in a traditional market which explains the 
higher consumer surplus. It is interesting to notice that in the crowdfunded market, the entrepreneur 
enters only when 𝑀 ≥
1
3
 (which can be obtained by substituting the equilibrium 𝑆𝐶 , 𝐾𝐶  and 𝑃𝐶  in ?̃?) 
and the entrepreneur do not enter the market when 𝑀 <
1
3
. For 𝑀 <
1
3
, the entrepreneur does operate in 
a traditional market. That implies for 𝑀 <
1
3
, consumer surplus is higher with a traditional market (with 
surplus in crowdfunding being equal to zero). However, given the equilibrium choices of marketing 
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mix elements, probability of the entrepreneur not entering (given by the probability of 𝑀 <
1
3
 which is 
1/3) is smaller than the probability of the firm entering (given by the probability of 𝑀 ≥
1
3
 which is 2/3). 
With higher probability of entry and a higher a quality product, the consumers expect to derive higher 
surplus. In other words, while in general it is true that choosing a marginally higher quality marginally 
reduces the probability of market entry by increasing the funding goal, overall, equilibrium choices of 
advertising and quality are such that the probability of entering the market is higher than the probability 
of not entering the market. Factoring that in, the funders expected surplus is higher under crowdfunding 
than in traditional market. 
6. Model Extensions 
The model analysis has primarily focused on the benefits offered by crowdfunded market due 
to its AON feature and how such benefits translates to equilibrium strategies. In the following I 
undertake two extensions of the model. The basic thrust of the extensions is to highlight that there may 
be benefits to sell a product through the traditional channel over selling through crowdfunding. 
However, even after taking those into consideration, the core results qualitatively may persist to hold. 
Specifically, in the first extension, I relax the assumption that market uncertainty which is captured by 
the distribution of 𝑀 being drawn from a uniform distribution [0,1]. Instead I introduce a parameter 
that allows me to vary the level of uncertainty associated with M. In a second extension, I relax the 
assumption that willingness to pay (captured by 𝜃) for a crowdfunded product and a traditional product 
are the same. 
6.1.  Market Uncertainty 
Uncertainty in the paper is captured by the assumption that the market size 𝑀 is a draw from a 
uniform distribution [0,1]. In this section, I relax the assumption. Specifically, I assume that the market 
size 𝑀 follows the uniform distribution over [
1
2
− 𝛽,
1
2
+ 𝛽]. When 𝛽 is high, the distribution of 𝑀 has 
a larger spread that leads to a higher degree of uncertainty. When 𝛽 is low, the degree of uncertainty is 
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lower. Furthermore, I restrict the range of 𝛽 to [
1
4
,
1
2
] to guarantee an interior solution.15 In the following 
analysis, I examine the impact of 𝛽 on quality, price, advertising, and profit.  
In the traditional entry scenario, the entrepreneur makes marketing strategies based on the 
expected market size 𝑀. Since 𝛽 does not influence the expectation of 𝑀, the entrepreneur’s quality 
and price decision, as well as the profit expectation, remain the same as in the base model. However, 
the alternate assumptions affect the equilibrium in the crowdfunded market. Similar to previous sections, 
I can obtain the entrepreneur’s expected profit. 
𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝐾𝐶 , 𝑆𝐶 , 𝐺)] =
1
32𝛽
(
1
2
+ 𝛽 −
4𝐺
𝐾𝐶𝑆𝐶
) ∗ (8𝐺 + 𝐾𝐶𝑆𝐶 + 2𝛽𝐾𝐶𝑆𝐶 − 4𝑆𝐶
2) −
𝐾𝐶
3
24
(13) 
It can be shown that the entrepreneur’s optimal funding goal, quality, and advertising level are 
respectively 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
(1+2𝛽)4
1296𝛽
, and 𝐾𝐶
∗ =
(1+2𝛽)3
108𝛽
. The entrepreneur earns 𝐸[𝜋𝐶
∗] =
(1+2𝛽)9
60466176𝛽3
. In the 
following Proposition 2.4, I compare the profit in the crowdfunding and traditional markets. However, 
my primary focus is to outline and explain the effect of marginal changes in the uncertainty parameter, 
𝛽 of profit. 
Proposition 2.4. In the traditional marketplace, the degree of uncertainty does not influence the 
entrepreneur’s marketing strategy nor her profit expectation. In crowdfunding, the product quality, 
advertising level, as well as the entrepreneur’s profit expectation increases in the degree of uncertainty. 
For any 𝛽 ∈ [
1
4
,
1
2
], crowdfunding generates higher expected profit for the entrepreneur. 
The last part of the proposition confirms the result that crowdfunding generates higher profit. 
One can again trace dichotomizing the excess profit from crowdfunding into direct and indirect benefits. 
The additional insights from this section comes from the first part of the proposition which outlines the 
effect of uncertainty.  As mentioned previously, the equilibrium in the traditional market is invariant to 
the alternative assumption. On the contrary, the degree of uncertainty plays a significant role in 
crowdfunding, due to the safeguarding effect and quality/advertising enhancement effect. First, I find 
                                                      
15 Relaxing this restriction does not change my results qualitatively. 
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that higher degree of uncertainty (𝛽 ) enlarges the safeguarding effect, in effect suggesting that 
crowdfunding platform yields higher profit with marginal increase in uncertainty. This is because, with 
larger β, the entrepreneur is likely to either face a very large market or a very small market. In other 
words, both the downside risk and upside benefit are increasing in 𝛽 which makes the safeguarding 
effect even more valuable.  
To quantify the increased value of safeguarding more clearly, I compute the expected market 
size, conditional on the project being funded. For any given quality level 𝑆, advertising level 𝐾, and the 
corresponding optimal funding goal 𝐺 =
𝑆2
2
, the entrepreneur only enters the market if the money raised 
through crowdfunding covers the funding goal (i.e., 𝐾𝑀
𝑆
2
≥ 𝐺 =
𝑆2
2
). By rearranging the terms, I can 
rewrite the condition as 𝑀 ≥
2𝑆
𝐾
. That means the funding campaign is only successful if the market size 
is no less than 
2𝑆
𝐾
. Since 𝑀  follows the uniform distribution over [
1
2
− 𝛽,
1
2
+ 𝛽] , the conditional 
expectation of 𝑀  given funding success is 𝐸 [𝑀 |𝑀 ≥
2𝑆
𝐾
] =
1
4
+
𝛽
2
+
𝑆
𝐾
, which is increasing in 𝛽 . 
Therefore, an increase in 𝛽 provides a first order effect on expected market size and eventually on profit.  
There is also a second order effect that gets channeled through equilibrium choices of 
advertising and quality. As mentioned above, with larger 𝛽 the entrepreneur expects to face a larger 
demand conditional on the project being successfully funded. With a higher expected market size, the 
entrepreneur is more willing to advertise more and is also willing to produce a higher quality product 
in equilibrium. Technically, this can be seen from the fact that both 𝑆∗(𝛽) =
1
1296𝛽
(1 + 2𝛽)4  and 
𝐾∗(𝛽) =
1
108𝛽
(1 + 2𝛽)3  are increasing functions of 𝛽. Now, higher 𝑆∗(𝛽) and 𝐾∗(𝛽) increases the 
expected market size given by 
1
4
+
𝛽
2
+
𝑆
𝐾
 even higher because 
𝑆∗(𝛽)
𝐾∗(𝛽)
 is also increasing in 𝛽. In other 
words, the first order effect increases expected market size which leads to higher advertising and higher 
product quality. Higher advertising and higher quality increases the expected market size even further. 
Finally, a larger addressable market and a higher quality product yields a larger profit and the 
entrepreneur benefits from marginal increase in 𝛽. 
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To summarize, higher uncertainty comes with greater downside risk as well as more upside 
opportunity. Downside risk makes crowdfunding’s safeguarding function more valuable, while upside 
opportunity strengthens the quality/advertising enhancement effect. In total, the two-part effect of a 
marginal increase in 𝛽, enables the entreprenuer to extract more revenue from the large demand, without 
worrying much about the market being very small. As a result, the expected profit increases when the 
market uncertainty is higher.  
Finally, looking at the welfare implication of 𝛽. my result suggests that the expected consumer 
surplus 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝐶] =
(1+2𝛽)9
6718464𝛽3
 in crowdfunding is increasing in 𝛽. Such an effect is driven by the high 
product quality associated with high 𝛽. 
The above formulation can also be used to discern the effect of difference in potential market 
size in traditional and crowdfunded platforms. To wit, one may think that the market size in 
crowdfunding is smaller compared with traditional market. One possible reason is that the reach of 
crowdfunding platforms is not comparable to those of retail giants, such as Amazon. To capture that 
one can slightly alter the above formulation by assuming that M is a draw from uniform [0,1] when 
selling through traditional retail channel but M is drawn from uniform [
1
2
− 𝛽,
1
2
+ 𝛽] when selling 
through a crowdfunding platform. Moreover, to capture a smaller market potential with crowdfunding 
one can assume 𝛽 < 1/2. One can again show that with a smaller market potential, the entrepreneur 
may be able to advertise more, produce a higher quality product and expect to make higher profits.16  
6.2.  Heterogeneity in Quality Preference 
One difference between crowdfunding and traditional market consumers may lie in their 
preferences for the products. On the one hand, consumers in the crowdfunding scenario may have a 
lower valuation of the crowdfunded product because it is not immediately accessible. On the other hand, 
they may be willing to pay more in the crowdfunding context out of the noneconomic motivations 
(Mollick 2014). Such motivations include the community benefits crowdfunders get through interaction 
                                                      
16 The analysis is available from the author. 
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with the project owners (Belleflamme et al. 2013) or the desire to support entrepreneurship (i.e., the 
warm-glow effect in Hu et al. 2015). To account for the potential difference between the two 
populations, I assume that the quality preference 𝜃 follows different distributions in the traditional vs. 
crowdfunding scenario. In the traditional scenario, 𝜃 follows the same distribution as in the main model, 
the uniform distribution over [0,1]. In crowdfunding, I assume that 𝜃 is distributed uniformly over 
[0, 𝑎]. The value of 𝑎 captures the difference in quality preference across the two scenarios. If 𝑎 < 1, 
consumers, on average, value a project in crowdfunding less than that in the traditional market. On the 
contrary, consumers on average value the crowdfunded product more than that in the traditional market 
if 𝑎 > 1. By incorporating the additional assumption of quality preference into the model, I can solve 
for the entrepreneur’s optimal marketing strategies. The optimal product quality, price, and advertising 
level are respectively 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
2𝑎3
81
, 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
𝑎4
81
, and 𝐾𝐶
∗ =
4𝑎2
27
. As expected, all the strategic variables, price, 
product quality and advertising level are increasing in the parameter a.  Comparing these values to those 
in the traditional scenario, I obtain Proposition 2.5. 
Proposition 2.5. When consumers’ quality preference 𝜃 is distributed uniformly over [0, 𝑎] in 
crowdfunding, the product quality is higher in crowdfunding than in the traditional scenario if 𝑎 ≥
3
4
(
3
2
)
1 3⁄
≈ 0.859. The price is higher in crowdfunding if 𝑎 ≥
3
2
(
1
8
)
1 4⁄
≈ 0.892, and the advertising 
level is higher in crowdfunding if 𝑎 ≥
3
4
(
3
2
)
1 2⁄
≈ 0.919. The expected profit is higher in crowdfunding 
if 𝑎 ≥
3
4
(
3
2
)
1 2⁄
≈ 0.919. The consumer surplus is higher in crowdfunding if 𝑎 ≥
39/7
215/7
≈ 0.930. 
We see that the crowdfunding still enables the entrepreneur to produce higher quality product 
and conduct more advertising as long as the consumers’ quality preference in the crowdfunding context 
is not too low compared with that in the traditional market. In other words, given some boundary market 
conditions, the core results of the paper hold with this alternate formulation.  
The noteworthy result, however, relates to values of a that is sufficiently high but still is less 
than 1. Consider the region 0.919 ≤ 𝑎 < 1. For 0.919 ≤ 𝑎 < 1, even though the average willingness 
to pay for a product sold through crowdfunding platform is lower than the average willingness to pay 
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for a product sold through the traditional market, the entrepreneur still makes a higher profit selling 
through the crowdfunding platform. For such high values, the entrepreneur is able to charge higher 
prices, advertise more and produce a higher quality product. The choice of higher strategic variables is 
even more interesting when gleaned from another angle. In both the crowdfunded and the traditional 
market, consumers with high quality preference (𝜃 > 𝑃/𝑆) end up buying the product in equilibrium. 
However, maximum 𝜃 is higher in the traditional market than in the crowdfunded market because 
0.919 ≤ 𝑎 < 1. Put differently, even though in equilibrium demand is derived from the high end of the 
market and the high end is higher in the traditional market, crowdfunding nonetheless delivers higher 
profit. The reason why the entrepreneur is able to make a higher profit again rests on the safeguarding 
effect that increases the equilibrium choice of ads, quality, and price higher. Higher product quality 
drives up consumers’ willingness to pay, while more advertising keeps more consumers informed. 
When 0.919 ≤ 𝑎 < 1 , the joint force of higher 𝐾  and 𝑆  overrides the negative impact of lower 
consumer preference. I can see this effect by focusing on the indifferent consumers in the traditional vs. 
crowdfunding scenarios. In the equilibrium, the indifferent consumer in the traditional market has a 
quality preference of 𝜃𝑇̅̅ ̅ =
1
2
, while the indifferent consumers’ quality preference in crowdfunding is 
𝜃𝐶̅̅ ̅ =
𝑎
2
< 𝜃𝑇̅̅ ̅. However, given the high product quality, the indifferent consumer in crowdfunding 
actually has higher willingness-to-pay for 0.919 ≤ 𝑎 < 1. This can be seen from the fact that 𝜃𝐶̅̅ ̅𝑆𝐶
∗ =
𝑎4
81
> 𝜃𝑇̅̅ ̅𝑆𝑇
∗ =
1
128
. In other words, the indifferent customer is willing to pay more in the crowdfunding 
platform. Indeed for the same reason, willingness to pay is higher for the entire mass of potential 
demand - [𝜃𝐶̅̅ ̅, 𝑎]  in crowdfunding and [𝜃𝑇̅̅ ̅,1] in traditional. Moreover, higher 𝐾  in crowdfunding 
ensures that, in equilibrium, a greater proportion of consumers with higher willingness to pay end up 
buying the product in the crowdfunded market vis-à-vis traditional market. Thus, even though 𝑎 < 1, 
the entrepreneur is able to appropriate higher profit in the crowdfunded market. In summary, the core 
thrust of the result alludes to the overwhelming effect of safeguarding even when, on average, 
consumers are willing to pay less for a product from a crowdfunded market than in a traditional market.  
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Coming to consumer (or funder) surplus, once again, crowdfunding generates higher expected 
consumer surplus as long as 𝑎 is greater than 0.930. It is worth noting that the lower value of a in 
crowdfunding, by definition, will drag down consumer surplus, since consumers now are harder to 
satisfy. Even so, the higher quality and more advertising in crowdfunding are able to boost the overall 
welfare of such consumers. 
In summary, my results suggest the safeguarding effect, which allows the entrepreneur against 
uncertain market conditions in turn boosting the key strategic variables, persists under the alternate 
model formulation. In the following I discuss my key findings, outline some managerial implications 
and end with a brief note on limitations and some viable path for future research. 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
In their paper “Democratizing Innovation and Capital Access”, Mollick and Robb (2016, pp.75) 
attest to one of the primary benefits of crowdfunding platforms - “Crowdfunding serves as an excellent 
tool for demonstrating demand, since it shows the willingness to pay for a product”. Demonstration of 
demand de facto provides a safeguard against poor market conditions. Such a safeguard does not accrue 
if one sells a product through traditional channels. In traditional markets, even though one can use 
market research to gauge market demand, actual reactions from real buyers are not observed until the 
product is produced and sold. In this paper, I provide a simple micro foundation of demand safeguards 
provided by crowdfunding that allows me to tease out the effect of such safeguards on marketing mix 
elements - price, quality and advertising.  
The core benefit from crowdfunding afforded by demand safeguards can be broken into two 
parts. The first effect is straightforward - crowdfunding delivers higher ex-ante profit by simply 
protecting the entrepreneur against poor market conditions. I call this the direct effect. The second effect 
is a little more nuanced. The protection against poor market allows the entrepreneur to advertise more 
and produce a higher quality product relative to a traditional channel. A higher quality product also 
allows the entrepreneur to charge a higher price, in turn, delivering higher profit. I call this the indirect 
effect of crowdfunding. Critical to the mechanics of the indirect effect is the complementarity of 
advertising and quality choices - to sell the higher quality product, the entrepreneur increases its 
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advertising in equilibrium to raise awareness of its higher quality product. Moroever higher levels of 
advertising increases the incentive to make a higher quality product because higher quality enables 
greater revenue extraction. The source of the complementarity again harkens back to the demand 
safeguard provided in the crowdfunding platform. my results also suggest that consumer (funder) 
surplus are higher in a crowdfunded platform than in a traditional market. There are more funders that 
are informed in a crowdfunded platform and they receive a higher quality product leading to higher 
aggregate consumer surplus. The result that crowdfunding platform allows an entrepreneur to sell a 
relatively high quality product is consistent with Mollick and Nanda (2016). They find that, on average, 
the projects that are funded on kickstarter.com are of higher quality than the ones that are not funded.  
The above result can be useful for innovators when unpacked differently. my results suggest 
than an entrepreneur with a high price - high quality product than what is currently available in the 
market may be better off selling the product through a crowdfunding platform rather than a traditional 
platform. This may especially be relevant for innovators with limited access to capital for whom 
downside risk of uncertain market conditions can be dooming. This interpretation comports well with 
some anecdotes. Take for instance the craft ice cream company MilkMaid Ice Cream started by Diana 
Hardeman. The company sells super premium all-natural ice cream. One can get a monthly subscription 
of $35 for just two pints of ice cream. One can also buy six pints for around $70. In a case study Glinska 
and Murray (2015) document the successful launch of MilkMaid through kickstarter.com. One rationale 
for the choice of a crowdfunding platform is, launching a premium product through a traditional channel 
requires raising funds from other sources such as from angel investors. Investors may perceive greater 
uncertainty supporting a venture from an innovator who is selling a high end product that comes with 
high premium. Crowdfunding is a particularly useful channel choice for such products. Demand 
safeguards delivers higher profit for entrepreneurs and higher surplus for funders. my results also 
suggest that the entrepreneur will be best served by launching an awareness advertising campaign. The 
campaign may help the entrepreneur to reap larger profit from a bigger addressable market.  
The above issue of crowdfunding being profitable in highly uncertain markets is confirmed 
with an extension in which I solely focus on how marginal changes in uncertainty affects entrepreneur’s 
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marketing mix. my results suggest that in crowdfunded markets, increase in uncertainty increases profits 
for entrepreneurs and it also increases surplus for funders. This lends support to the result above that 
crowdfunding is a viable alternative in highly volatile markets. Finally, in another extension I show that 
even though average willingness to pay for consumers in the crowdfunding platform is lower relative 
to a traditional market, the entrepreneur may still be able to advertise more, sell a higher quality product, 
charge a higher a higher price and make higher ex-ante profit. In other words, the effects of demand 
safeguard that works thorough the marketing mix elements holds robust under various market 
modifications - even when the decks are stacked against operating in a crowdfunding platform.  
Our model focuses on the particular form of reward-based crowdfunding to illustrate how an 
entrepreneur should take marketing strategies different from those in the traditional entry scenario. The 
entrepreneurs in my model can credibly commit to a product quality level in the crowdfunding stage. 
However, it is not always possible for entrepreneurs to make such credible commitments. The lack of 
credible commitment may give rise to the moral hazard problem: some entrepreneurs, after 
crowdfunding success, have the tendency to embezzle funds instead of investing properly in production 
(Strausz 2017). Thus, it will be interesting to extend the work to the situation where credible 
commitment is not possible and moral hazard issues exists. The role of crowdfunding as a two-sided 
platform is another issue that is worth exploring. In this paper, I focus on the interaction between the 
entrepreneur and the crowd. Under my conceptualization, the crowdfunding platform is just another 
channel to transfer goods from the entrepreneur to the crowd. In effect, this paper refrains from 
considering nuances of two-sided economics. It will therefore be interesting to analyze the issue of 
demand safeguards and marketing mix with a two-sided formulation. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Characterization of Buyers in an Illustrative Example 
Buyer 
segment 
Size of buyer 
segment 
Willingness-to-pay for a ticket 
A plays in the game B plays in the game 
Segment 1 1 $10 $2 
Segment 2 1 $2 $10 
 
Table 2. Solutions without Capacity Constraint 
Table 2a: Traditional Selling 
Parameter values 𝛽 <
1
2
 𝛽 ≥
1
2
 
Optimal price 
1
2
 𝛽 
Sales 
1
1 − 𝛽
 2 
Revenue 
1
2(1 − 𝛽)
 2𝛽 
 
Table 2b: Contingency Selling 
Parameter values 𝛽 <
1
3
 𝛽 ≥
1
3
 
Optimal price for A ticket 
1
2
 
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
 
Optimal price for B ticket 
1
2
 
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
 
Sales for A ticket 
1
2
 1 
Sales for B ticket 
1
2
 1 
Revenue 
1
2
 
2𝛽
1 + 𝛽
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Table 3. Traditional Selling with Capacity Constraint 
Parameter 
values 
𝛽 <
1
2
  𝛽 ≥
1
2
 
𝑆𝐶 <
1
1 − 𝛽
 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
1 − 𝛽
   
Optimal price 1 −
𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽)
2
 
1
2
  1 −
𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽)
2
 
Sales 𝑆𝐶 
1
1 − 𝛽
  𝑆𝐶 
Revenue 
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽))
2
 
1
2(1 − 𝛽)
  
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽))
2
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Table 4. Contingency Selling with Capacity Constraint 
Parameter 
values 
𝛽 <
1
3
 
1
3
≤ 𝛽 <
1
2
 𝛽 ≥
1
2
 
𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
2
 𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
 
1
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1 −
√3𝛽 − 1
2√𝛽
 1 −
√3𝛽 − 1
2√𝛽
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1 1 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 𝑆𝐶 < 1 − 𝛽 1 − 𝛽 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1 1 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 
optimal price 
for A ticket 
1 − 𝑆𝐶 
1
2
 1 − 𝑆𝐶 
1
2
 
𝛽(2 − 𝑆𝐶)
1 + 𝛽
 
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
 1 − 𝑆𝐶 
𝛽(2 − 𝑆𝐶)
1 + 𝛽
 
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
 
optimal price 
for B ticket 
1 − 𝑆𝐶 
1
2
 1 − 𝑆𝐶 
1
2
 
𝛽(2 − 𝑆𝐶)
1 + 𝛽
 
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
 1 − 𝑆𝐶 
𝛽(2 − 𝑆𝐶)
1 + 𝛽
 
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
 
sales for A 
ticket 
𝑆𝐶 
1
2
 𝑆𝐶 
1
2
 𝑆𝐶 1 𝑆𝐶 𝑆𝐶 1 
sales for B 
ticket 
𝑆𝐶 
1
2
 𝑆𝐶 
1
2
 𝑆𝐶 1 𝑆𝐶 𝑆𝐶 1 
revenue 
2𝑆𝐶(1
− 𝑆𝐶) 
1
2
 
2𝑆𝐶(1
− 𝑆𝐶) 
1
2
 
2𝛽𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶)
1 + 𝛽
 
2𝛽
1 + 𝛽
 
2𝑆𝐶(1
− 𝑆𝐶) 
2𝛽𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶)
1 + 𝛽
 
2𝛽
1 + 𝛽
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Table 5. Traditional Selling with Secondary Market and Neutral Price 
Parameter 
values 
𝛽 <
1
2
  𝛽 ≥
1
2
 
𝑆𝐶 <
1
1 − 𝛽
 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
1 − 𝛽
   
Optimal 
price 
2 − 𝑆𝐶 + 𝑆𝐶𝛽
2
 
1
2
  
2 − 𝑆𝐶 + 𝑆𝐶𝛽
2
 
Sales 𝑆𝐶 
1
1 − 𝛽
  𝑆𝐶 
Revenue 
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶 + 𝑆𝐶𝛽)
2
 
1
2(1 − 𝛽)
  
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶 + 𝑆𝐶𝛽)
2
 
 
Table 6. Contingency Selling with Secondary Market and Neutral Price 
Parameter values 𝑆𝐶 <
1 − 𝛽
2
 
1 − 𝛽
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
3 + 𝛽
4
 𝑆𝐶 ≥
3 + 𝛽
4
 
optimal price for 𝐴 
ticket 
1 − 𝑆𝐶 
3 − 2𝑆𝐶 + 𝛽
4
 
3 + 𝛽
8
 
optimal price for 𝐵 
ticket 
1 − 𝑆𝐶 
3 − 2𝑆𝐶 + 𝛽
4
 
3 + 𝛽
8
 
sales for 𝐴 ticket 𝑆𝐶 𝑆𝐶 
3 + 𝛽
4
 
sales for 𝐵 ticket 𝑆𝐶 𝑆𝐶 
3 + 𝛽
4
 
Revenue 2𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑆𝐶) 
𝑆𝐶(3 − 2𝑆𝐶 + 𝛽)
2
 
(3 + 𝛽)2
16
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Table 7. Traditional Selling with Secondary Market and Rubinstein Negotiation Price 
Table 7a: 𝛾 ≥ 𝛾 
Parameter values 𝑆𝐶 < 1 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 1 
Resale price in state 𝐴 or 𝐵 
1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
Secondary market trading volume in state 𝐴 or 
𝐵 
𝑆𝐶
2
 
1
2
 
Firm’s optimal price 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2 − 𝛾
 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
 
Sales 𝑆𝐶 1 
Revenue (1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2 − 𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
 
 
Table 7b: 𝛾 < 𝛾 & 𝛽 ≥ 𝛽 
Parameter values 𝑆𝐶 < 1 1 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆?̃? 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 𝑆?̃? 
Resale price in state 𝐴 or 
𝐵 
1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
1 − 𝛾 + 𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
Secondary market trading 
volume in state 𝐴 or 𝐵 
𝑆𝐶
2
 
1
2
 
𝑆𝐶
2
 
Firm’s optimal price 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2 − 𝛾
 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)((1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶 + 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
 
Sales 𝑆𝐶 1 𝑆𝐶 
Revenue (1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2 − 𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
 (1 −
(1 − 𝛽)((1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶 + 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
)𝑆𝐶 
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Table 7. Traditional Selling with Secondary Market and Rubinstein Negotiation Price (Continued) 
Table 7c: 𝛾 < 𝛾 & 𝛽 < 𝛽 
Parameter values 𝑆𝐶 < 1 1 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆?̃? 𝑆?̃? ≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
2 − (2 − 𝛽)𝛾
2(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
 𝑆𝐶 ≥
2 − (2 − 𝛽)𝛾
2(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
 
Resale price in 
state 𝐴 or 𝐵 
1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
1 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
1 − 𝛾 + 𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
1 − 𝛾 + 𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 
Secondary market 
trading volume in 
state 𝐴 or 𝐵 
𝑆𝐶
2
 
1
2
 
𝑆𝐶
2
 
2 − (2 − 𝛽)𝛾
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
 
Firm’s optimal 
price 
1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2 − 𝛾
 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)((1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶 + 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
 
2 − (2 − 𝛽)𝛾
2(2 − 𝛾)
 
Sales 𝑆𝐶 1 𝑆𝐶 
2 − (2 − 𝛽)𝛾
2(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
 
Revenue (1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2 − 𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 1 −
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
 (1 −
(1 − 𝛽)((1 − 𝛾)𝑆𝐶 + 𝛾)
2 − 𝛾
)𝑆𝐶 
(2 − (2 − 𝛽)𝛾)2
4(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)(2 − 𝛾)
 
*𝛾 = {
−
2(−1+𝛽+√1−2𝛽−𝛽2)
−3+3𝛽+√1−2𝛽−𝛽2
, 𝛽 < 0.4
−1+3𝛽
𝛽
, 𝛽 ≥ 0.4
, 𝛽 = {
2(1−𝛾)
4−3𝛾
, 𝛾 < 0.5
1
3−𝛾
, 𝛾 ≥ 0.5
, and 𝑆?̃? =
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾−√𝛽2(4−8𝛾+5𝛾2)+(8𝛽−4)(1−𝛾)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
 
 
68 
 
 
 
Table 8. Contingency Selling with Decentralized Secondary Market 
Parameter values 
𝑆𝐶
<
1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾 + 𝛽𝛾
2 − 𝛾
 
1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾 + 𝛽𝛾
2 − 𝛾
≤ 𝑆𝐶
<
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
2(2 − 𝛾)
 
𝑆𝐶
≥
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
2(2 − 𝛾)
 
optimal price for 
𝐴 ticket 
1 − 𝑆𝐶 
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
4 − 2𝛾
−
𝑆𝐶
2
 
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
4(2 − 𝛾)
 
optimal price for 
𝐵 ticket 
1 − 𝑆𝐶 
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
4 − 2𝛾
−
𝑆𝐶
2
 
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
4(2 − 𝛾)
 
sales for 𝐴 ticket 𝑆𝐶 𝑆𝐶 
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
2(2 − 𝛾)
 
sales for 𝐵 ticket 𝑆𝐶 𝑆𝐶 
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
2(2 − 𝛾)
 
Revenue 2𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑆𝐶) 𝑆𝐶 (
3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾
2 − 1𝛾
− 𝑆𝐶) 
(3 + 𝛽 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾)2
4(2 − 𝛾)2
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Table 9. Spot Selling 
Parameter values 
𝛽 <
1
2
  𝛽 ≥
1
2
 
𝑆𝐶 < 1 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 1  𝑆𝐶 < 1 1 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
1
𝛽
 
1
𝛽
≤ 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 2 
optimal price in state 
𝐴 
1 1  1 1 𝛽 
optimal price in state 
𝐵 
1 1  1 1 𝛽 
sales in state 𝐴 SC 1  SC 1 SC 
sales in state 𝐵 SC 1  SC 1 SC 
revenue SC 1  SC 1 βSC 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Derivation of the Results in Table 3 “Traditional Selling with Capacity Constraint” 
Under traditional selling, the firm maximizes the following revenue function. 
𝜋𝑇(𝑃) =
{
 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛{2𝑃, 𝑆𝐶 ⋅ 𝑃}, 𝑃 < 𝛽
𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
2𝑃(1 − 𝑃)
1 − 𝛽
, 𝑆𝐶 ⋅ 𝑃} , 𝛽 ≤ 𝑃 < 1
0, 𝑃 ≥ 1
 
When 𝛽 ≥
1
2
, the constraint is always binding. The firm’s optimal price is 1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
, which 
results in a revenue of 
𝑆𝐶(2−𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽))
2
. When 𝛽 <
1
2
, the constraint is only binding for 𝑆𝐶 <
1
1−𝛽
. When 
𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
1−𝛽
, the firm charges the price 
1
2
 and earns a revenue of 
1
2(1−𝛽)
. 
 
Appendix 2. Derivation of the Results in Table 4 “Contingency Selling with Capacity 
Constraint” 
Here, I take contingent ticket 𝐴 as an example. The solution to the ticket 𝐵 can be obtained in 
the same fashion. With capacity constraint 𝑆𝐶, the revenue function for the 𝐴 ticket takes the following 
form. 
𝜋𝐴(𝑃𝐴) =
{
 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {(2 −
1 + 𝛽
𝛽
𝑃𝐴)𝑃𝐴, 𝑆𝐶 ⋅ 𝑃𝐴} , 𝑃𝐴 < 𝛽
𝑚𝑖𝑛{(1 − 𝑃𝐴)𝑃𝐴 , 𝑆𝐶 ⋅ 𝑃𝐴}, 𝛽 ≤ 𝑃𝐴 < 1
0, 𝑃𝐴 ≥ 1
 
When 𝛽 <
1
3
, the 𝑆𝐶 constraint is binding for 𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
, the optimal price is 𝑃𝐴
∗ = 1 − 𝑆𝐶. For 
𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
2
, the constraint is not binding, and 𝑃𝐴
∗ =
1
2
. 
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When 
1
3
≤ 𝛽 <
1
2
 and 𝑆𝐶 >
1
2
, 𝑆𝐶 is binding, and 𝑃𝐴
∗ = 1 − 𝑆𝐶 . For 
1
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1 −
√3𝛽−1
√𝛽
, 𝑆𝐶 
is not binding and 𝑃𝐴
∗ =
1
2
. For 1 −
√3𝛽−1
√𝛽
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1, 𝑆𝐶 is again binding and 𝑃𝐴
∗ =
𝛽(2−𝑆𝐶)
1+𝛽
. For 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1, the constraint is not binding and 𝑃𝐴
∗ =
𝛽
1+𝛽
. 
When 𝛽 ≥
1
2
, 𝑆𝐶 is binding for 𝑆𝐶 < 1. For 𝑆𝐶 < 1 − 𝛽, the firm sells only to segment 1 at 
𝑃𝐴
∗ = 1 − 𝑆𝐶. For 1 − 𝛽 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1, the firm sells to both segment 1 and 2 at 𝑃𝐴
∗ =
𝛽(2−𝑆𝐶)
1+𝛽
. For 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1, 𝑆𝐶 is not binding and 𝑃𝐴
∗ =
𝛽
1+𝛽
. Similarly, I obtain 𝑃𝐵
∗  for contingent 𝐵 ticket and total revenue 
𝜋𝐶 = 𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵. 
 
Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 1.2a 
First, I look at the case 𝛽 <
1
3
. For 𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
, 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 = 2𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑆𝐶). For 
1
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
1
1−𝛽
, 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 =
1
2
 holds if 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ =
1−√𝛽
1−𝛽
. It can be verified that 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  
lies in the range [
1
2
,
1
1−𝛽
]. 
Second, I turn to the case 
1
3
≤ 𝛽 < ?̅? ≈ 0.420. When 𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
, 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 =
2𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑆𝐶). When 
1
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1 −√
3𝛽−1
4𝛽
, the contingency selling revenue is 
1
2
, while the traditional 
selling revenue is 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
). The contingency selling generates higher revenue if 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ =
1−√𝛽
1−𝛽
. It can be verified that 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ =
1−√𝛽
1−𝛽
 lies in the range [
1
2
, 1 − √
3𝛽−1
4𝛽
]. 
Third, I look at the case ?̅? ≤ 𝛽 <
1
2
. When 𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
, 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 = 2𝑆𝐶(1 −
𝑆𝐶) . When 
1
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1 −√
3𝛽−1
4𝛽
, 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 =
1
2
. When 1 −√
3𝛽−1
4𝛽
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1 , 
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𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 =
2𝑆𝐶(2−𝑆𝐶)𝛽
1+𝛽
 if 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ =
2(3𝛽−1)
−1+4𝛽+𝛽2
. It can be verified that 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ =
2(3𝛽−1)
−1+4𝛽+𝛽2
 lies in the range [1 − √
3𝛽−1
4𝛽
, 1]. 
Finally, I examine the case 𝛽 ≥
1
2
. For 𝑆𝐶 < 1 − 𝛽, 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 = 2𝑆𝐶(1 −
𝑆𝐶). For 1 − 𝛽 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1, 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 =
2𝑆𝐶(2−𝑆𝐶)𝛽
1+𝛽
 if 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ =
2(3𝛽−1)
−1+4𝛽+𝛽2
. It can 
be verified that the threshold 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ =
2(3𝛽−1)
−1+4𝛽+𝛽2
 lies in the range [1 − 𝛽, 1]. 
 
Appendix 4. Proof of Proposition 1.2b 
By differentiating 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  with respect to 𝛽, I obtain the first order derivative of 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ . 
𝜕𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅
𝜕𝛽
=
{
 
 
 
 −
1
2(1 − √𝛽)
2
√𝛽
, 𝛽 < ?̅?
2 + 4𝛽 − 6𝛽2
(−1 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)2
, 𝛽 ≥ ?̅?
 
It is easy to check that 
𝜕𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅
𝜕𝛽
 is negative for 𝛽 < ?̅? and positive for 𝛽 ≥ ?̅?. 
 
Appendix 5. Derivation of the Results in Table 5 “Traditional Selling with Secondary Market 
and Neutral Price” 
First, I derive the following demand function of the general ticket. 
𝑄(𝑃𝑇) =
{
 
 1 +
𝑝 − 𝑃𝑇
𝑝 − 𝛽
, 𝑃 ≤ 𝑝
1 − 𝑃𝑇
1 − 𝑝
, 𝑃 > 𝑝
 
If I denote 𝑥  to the demand in segment 1 and 𝑦  to the demand in segment 2, it follows 
immediately that 𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑄. It is obvious that in an equilibrium, either 𝑄 < 1 or 𝑄 ≥ 1 must hold.  
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We first look at the case 𝑄 < 1. For the indifferent consumer 𝜃 in segment 1, the net valuations 
from “buy now” and “buy later” must equal in the equilibrium. 
𝜌𝜃 + (1 − 𝜌𝜃)𝑝 − 𝑃𝑇 = 𝜌𝜃(1 − 𝑝)
𝑦
1 − 𝑥
 
The expression 
𝑦
1−𝑥
 is the chance that consumer from segment 1 can get a ticket in the secondary 
market if the true state is 𝐴. Since 𝜌 follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1], I obtain 1 − 𝜌𝜃 = 𝑥. By 
substituting 𝜌𝜃  with 1 − 𝑥  and rearranging terms, I have 𝑥 + 𝑦 =
1−𝑃𝑇
1−𝑝
. Since 𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑄 , I have 
𝑄(𝑃𝑇) =
1−𝑃𝑇
1−𝑝
. For 𝑄 < 1 to hold, 𝑃𝑇  must be greater than 𝑝. 
Next, I turn to the case 𝑄 ≥ 1. Similar to the previous case, I obtain the following equality for 
the indifferent consumer 𝜃 in segment 1. 
𝜌𝜃 +
1 − 𝑦
𝑥
(1 − 𝜌𝜃)𝑝 + (1 −
1 − 𝑦
𝑥
) (1 − 𝜌𝜃)𝛽 − 𝑃𝑇 = 𝜌𝜃(1 − 𝑝) 
1−𝑦
𝑥
 refers to the probability that a consumer with a ticket is able to sell her ticket in the 
secondary market if the true state is 𝐵 . By replacing 𝜌𝜃  with 1 − 𝑥  and rearranging terms, I get 
𝑄(𝑃𝑇) = 1 +
𝑝−𝑃𝑇
𝑝−𝛽
. For 𝑄 ≥ 1 to be true, 𝑃𝑇  must be no greater than 𝑝. Thus, I have the demand 
function in the follow form. 
𝑄(𝑃𝑇) =
{
 
 1 +
𝑝 − 𝑃𝑇
𝑝 − 𝛽
, 𝑃𝑇 ≤ 𝑝
1 − 𝑃𝑇
1 − 𝑝
, 𝑃𝑇 > 𝑝
 
Since 𝑝 =
1+𝛽
2
, the above demand function can be expressed as 𝑄(𝑃𝑇) =
2(1−𝑃𝑇)
1−𝛽
. Then, I obtain 
the profit function, 𝜋𝑇(𝑃𝑇) =
2(1−𝑃𝑇)𝑃𝑇
1−𝛽
. The firm’s optimal pricing strategy is to charge 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
2−𝑆𝐶+𝑆𝐶𝛽
2
 
if 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
1
1−𝛽
, 2} and 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
1
2
 otherwise. The results in Table 5 have been derived. 
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Appendix 6. Derivation of the Results in Table 6 “Contingency Selling with Secondary Market 
and Neutral Price” 
Throughout this proof, I will take 𝐴 tickets as the example. The solution for 𝐵 tickets can be 
obtained in the same fashion. I first discuss the scenario when the firm only sells the contingent tickets 
of each type to its corresponding segment. All the 𝐴 tickets are sold to segment 1 consumers. Just as in 
the main model, the demand function would be 𝑄(𝑃𝐴) = 1 − 𝑃𝐴. This scenario holds as long as 𝑃𝐴 ≥ 𝑝. 
This is because when the primary price is lower than the resale price, segment 2 consumers cannot gain 
anything by buying and reselling 𝐴 tickets. It can be verified that it is optimal for the firm to price at 
𝑃𝐴 = 1 − 𝑆𝐶 and sells to only segment 1 as long as 𝑆𝐶 < 1 − 𝑝 =
1−𝛽
2
. 
Second, I analyze the scenario where the firm sells the contingent tickets of each type to both 
consumer segments. Let me denote 𝑥 to the demand in segment 1 and 𝑦 to the demand in segment 2, it 
follows immediately that either 𝑥 + 𝑦 < 1  or 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 1 . I discuss the case 𝑥 + 𝑦 < 1  first. For a 
consumer 𝑖 in segment 1, her net valuation from buying 𝐴 ticket now is 𝜌𝑖 − 𝑃𝐴, while her net valuation 
from “buy later” is 𝜌𝑖(1 − 𝑝)
𝑦
1−𝑥
. For a consumer 𝑗 in segment 2, her net valuation for 𝐴 ticket is 𝜌𝑗𝑝 −
𝑃𝐴, while her net valuation from “buy later” is 0. 
Under any price 𝑃𝐴, the net utility from “buy now” and “buy later” must equal for the indifferent 
consumer 𝜃 in segment 1 and the indifferent consumer 𝜇 in segment 2.  
{
𝜌𝜃 − 𝑃𝐴 = 𝜌𝜃(1 − 𝑝)
𝑦
1 − 𝑥
𝜌𝜇𝑝 − 𝑃𝐴 = 0
 
In segment 1, all the consumers with 𝜌 ≥ 𝜌𝜃 will pruchase the ticket, while in segment 2, all 
the consumers with 𝜌 ≥ 𝜌𝜇 will purchase the ticket. Thus, I can replace 𝜌𝜃 with 1 − 𝑥 and 𝜌𝜇 with 1 −
𝑦. 
{
1 − 𝑥 − 𝑃𝐴 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑦
(1 − 𝑦)𝑝 − 𝑃𝐴 = 0
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By adding up these two equations, I obtain 𝑥 + 𝑦 = 1 + 𝑝 − 2𝑃𝐴. Thus, the demand function 
becomes 𝑄(𝑃𝐴) = 1 + 𝑝 − 2𝑃𝐴. And the profit function is thus 𝜋(𝑃𝐴) = (1 + 𝑝 − 2𝑃𝐴)𝑃𝐴. Since 𝑝 =
1+𝛽
2
, the profit function can be rewritten as 𝜋(𝑃𝐴) = (1 +
1+𝛽
2
− 2𝑃𝐴) 𝑃𝐴. It turns my that the optimal 
price is 𝑃𝐴 =
3−2𝑆𝐶+𝛽
4
 if 𝑆𝐶 <
3+𝛽
4
 and 𝑃𝐴 =
3+𝛽
8
 otherwise. This holds if 
1−𝛽
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1. Within this 
range, the highest revenue the firm can gain is 
(3+𝛽)2
16
. 
Next, I prove that the revenue cannot be higher than 
(3+𝛽)2
16
 if the firm sells 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 1 tickets. 
When 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 1, the net valuation from “buy now” and “buy later” is 𝜌𝑖 − 𝑃𝐴  and 𝜌𝑖(1 − 𝑝) for a 
consumer 𝑖 in segment 1. For a consumer 𝑗 in segment 2, her net valuation for 𝐴 ticket is 𝜌𝑗
1−𝑥
𝑦
𝑝 +
𝜌𝑗 (1 −
1−𝑥
𝑦
)𝛽 − 𝑃𝐴, while her net valuation from “buy later” is 0. Under any price 𝑃, for the indifferent 
consumer, the net utility from “buy now” and “buy later” must equal for the indifferent consumer 𝜃 in 
segment 1 and the indifferent consumer 𝜇 in segment 2.  
{
𝜌𝜃 − 𝑃𝐴 = 𝜌𝜃(1 − 𝑝)
𝜌𝜇
1 − 𝑥
𝑦
𝑝 + 𝜌𝜇 (1 −
1 − 𝑥
𝑦
)𝛽 − 𝑃𝐴 = 0
 
Similar to the previous analysis, I can replace 𝜌𝜃 and 𝜌𝜇 with 1 − 𝑥 and 1 − 𝑦. 
{
1 − 𝑥 − 𝑃𝐴 = (1 − 𝑥)(1 − 𝑝)
(1 − 𝑦)
1 − 𝑥
𝑦
𝑝 + (1 − 𝑦) (1 −
1 − 𝑥
𝑦
)𝛽 − 𝑃𝐴 = 0
 
By solving these two equations simultaneously, I obtain the following demand function.  
𝑄(𝑃𝐴) =
3𝛽 + 3𝛽2 − 2𝑃𝐴(1 + 2𝛽) + √4𝑃𝐴
2 − 4𝑃𝐴𝛽2(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)2
2𝛽(1 + 𝛽)
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Let me suppose the firm can earn a revenue higher than 
(3+𝛽)2
16
 by selling 𝑄 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 1 tickets. 
Then, it must be the case that 𝑃𝐴 >
(3+𝛽)2
16(𝑥+𝑦)
. When 𝑃𝐴 >
(3+𝛽)2
16(𝑥+𝑦)
, the demand 𝑄(𝑃𝐴) must be smaller 
than 
−9−24𝛽+24𝛽(𝑥+𝑦)−13𝛽2+24𝛽2(𝑥+𝑦)−2𝛽3+8(𝑥+𝑦)√
(3+𝛽)4
64(𝑥+𝑦)2
−
𝛽2(1+𝛽)(3+𝛽)2
4(𝑥+𝑦)
+𝛽2(1+𝛽)2
16𝛽(1+𝛽)(𝑥+𝑦)
. 
It can be shown that the above expression is never greater than 𝑥 + 𝑦 for 𝑥 + 𝑦 ∈ [1, 2]. That 
means, to sell 𝑥 + 𝑦 tickets, the firm cannot set the price higher than 
(3+𝛽)2
16(𝑥+𝑦)
. As a result, the firm cannot 
earn a revenue higher than 
(3+𝛽)2
16
 by selling 𝑄 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 ≥ 1 tickets. In a word, the firm’s optimal price 
is 𝑃𝐴 =
3+𝛽
8
 for 𝑆𝐶 > 1. 
To summarize, the optimal price for ticket 𝐴 is 𝑃𝐴 = 1 − 𝑆𝐶 for 𝑆𝐶 <
1−𝛽
2
, 𝑃𝐴 =
3−2𝑆𝐶+𝛽
4
 for 
1−𝛽
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
3+𝛽
4
, and 𝑃𝐴 =
3+𝛽
8
 for 𝑆𝐶 ≥
3+𝛽
4
. In the similar fashion, the optimal price for ticket 𝐵 can 
be obtained. 
 
Appendix 7. Proof of Proposition 1.3 
First, I show that contingency selling always outperforms traditional selling for 𝑆𝐶 < 1 . 
Specifically, for 𝑆𝐶 <
1−𝛽
2
, 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 = 2𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑆𝐶) . For 
1−𝛽
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
3+𝛽
4
, 
𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 =
𝑆𝐶(3−2𝑆𝐶+𝛽)
2
. For 
3+𝛽
4
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1 , 𝜋𝑇 = 𝑆𝐶 (1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
) < 𝜋𝐶 =
(3+𝛽)2
16
. 
Second, I turn to the case 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 1 , where 𝜋𝐶 =
(3+𝛽)2
16
. Under traditional selling, 𝜋𝑇  is 
𝑆𝐶(2−𝑆𝐶+𝑆𝐶𝛽)
2
 for 𝑆𝐶 <
1
1−𝛽
 and 
1
2(1−𝛽)
 otherwise. When  𝑆𝐶  is smaller (greater) than 
4−√2(−1+3𝛽+5𝛽2+𝛽3)
4−4𝛽
, the contingency selling revenue 
(3+𝛽)2
16
 is higher (lower) than 
𝑆𝐶(2−𝑆𝐶+𝑆𝐶𝛽)
2
. It can 
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be verified that 
4−√2(−1+3𝛽+5𝛽2+𝛽3)
4−4𝛽
 lies in the range [1,
1
1−𝛽
] as long as 𝛽 ≥ √5 − 2. If 𝛽 < √5 − 2, 
the contingency selling revenue is always higher than the traditional selling revenue. 
 
Appendix 8. Proof of Lemma 1 “Resale Price through Bargaining” 
Lemma 1 is a modified version of the classic result in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, Chapter 
6).  Formally, the equilibrium is defined as follows: 
A combination of 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵), 𝑉𝑠(𝑆, 𝐵), and 𝑉𝐵(𝑆, 𝐵) is an equilibrium if it satisfies the following 
conditions. 
First, for 𝛥 ⟶ 0, 
{
(1 − 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵)) − 𝛾𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) = (𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) − 𝛽) − 𝛾𝑉𝑠(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥), |𝑆 < 𝐵
(1 − 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵)) − 𝛾𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝛥) = (𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) − 𝛽) − 𝛾𝑉𝑠(𝛥, 𝛥), |𝑆 = 𝐵
(1 − 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵)) − 𝛾𝑉𝐵(𝑆 − 𝐵 + 𝛥, 𝛥) = (𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) − 𝛽) − 𝛾𝑉𝑠(𝑆 − 𝐵 + 𝛥, 𝛥), |𝑆 > 𝐵
 
Second, 
{
 
 
 
 𝑉𝑠(𝑆, 𝐵) = 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) − 𝛽 and 𝑉𝐵(𝑆, 𝐵) =
𝑆
𝐵
(1 − 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵)), |𝑆 < 𝐵
𝑉𝑠(𝑆, 𝐵) = 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) − 𝛽 and 𝑉𝐵(𝑆, 𝐵) = 1 − 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵), |𝑆 = 𝐵
𝑉𝑠(𝑆, 𝐵) =
𝐵
𝑆
(𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) − 𝛽) and 𝑉𝐵(𝑆, 𝐵) = 1 − 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵), |𝑆 > 𝐵
 
The first condition ensures that 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) is the Nash solution given the surplus that a buyer-seller 
pair expects to gain if it deviates from the equilibrium. Note that in a continuum of consumer 
distribution, each individual counts for only a negligible portion, 𝛥 ⟶ 0. In the case 𝑆 < 𝐵, there will 
be 𝛥 + 𝐵 − 𝑆 buyers and 𝛥 seller in the market if a pair of matched buyer and seller deviates from the 
equilibrium. Thus, 𝑉𝑠(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) and 𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) are the seller’s and the buyer’s respective 
expected surplus if they cannot reach an agreement. The second condition ensures that it is rational for 
any buyer and seller, once matched, to accept the negotiated price 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵).  
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 The proof for 𝑆 < 𝐵 goes as follow. When there are more buyers than sellers in the secondary 
market, the equilibrium resale price must satisfy (𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) − 𝛽) − 𝛾𝑉𝑆(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) = (1 −
𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵)) − 𝛾𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) according to the aforementioned definition of equilibrium. Respectively, 
𝑉𝑆(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) and 𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) are the seller’s and buyer’s expected surpluses if they cannot 
reach an agreement in the first round and stay active in the market for the second round. They serve as 
the disagreement values in the first-round bargaining process. To solve for 𝑝 , I first solve for 
𝑉𝑆(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) and 𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) . Thus, I need to examine the equilibrium condition in the 
second round. For any matched buyer and seller, if they cannot reach an agreement in the first round, 
they enter the second round. Given that all the other individuals behave according to the equilibrium, 
there will be 𝛥 + 𝐵 − 𝑆 active buyers and 𝛥 active sellers in the second round, with 𝛥 ⟶ 0. In the 
second round, the probability to enter a match is 
𝛥
𝛥+𝐵−𝑆 
 for the buyer and 1 for the seller. If the matched 
pair cannot reach an agreement in the second round, there will still be 𝛥 + 𝐵 − 𝑆 buyers and 𝛥 sellers 
remaining active in the market. Thus, their expected payoff of entering the third round are still 
𝑉𝑆(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) and 𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥). For 𝑝(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) to be the equilibrium price in the second 
round, the following system of equations must be satisfied: 
{
 
 
(𝑝(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) − 𝛽) − 𝛾𝑉𝑆(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) = (1 − 𝑝(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥)) − 𝛾𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥)
𝑝(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) − 𝛽 = 𝑉𝑆(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥)
𝛥
𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥
(1 − 𝑝(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥)) = 𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥)
 
By solving the above system of equations, I obtain 
{
𝑉𝑆(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) =
1 − 𝛽
2 − 𝛾
𝑉𝐵(𝛥, 𝐵 − 𝑆 + 𝛥) = 0
 
By plugging these values into the equilibrium condition of the first round, I get 𝑝(𝑆, 𝐵) =
1 +(1 − 𝛾)𝛽
2 − 𝛾
 for 𝑆 < 𝐵. Similarly one can derive the equilibrium resale market bargained prices for 𝑆 =
𝐵 and 𝑆 > 𝐵. 
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Appendix 9. Derivation of the Results in Table 7 “Traditional Selling with Secondary Market 
and Rubenstein Negotiation Price” 
We derive the results in Table 7 in 3 steps. First, I solve for the case 𝑆𝐶 < 1. Following the 
same logic as ‘Derivation of Results in Table 5” above, I can show that the demand function is 𝑄(𝑃𝑇) =
1−𝑃𝑇
1−𝑝
 for 𝑆𝐶 < 1. Since 𝑆𝐶 < 1 and total market size is 2, there will be more buyers than sellers 
regardless of which state eventually occurs. According to Lemma 1, the resale price is 𝑝 =
1+(1−𝛾)𝛽
2−𝛾
 no 
matter which state (𝐴 or 𝐵) occurs. Thus, the demand function can be rewritten as 𝑄(𝑃𝑇) =
(2−𝛾)(1−𝑃𝑇)
1−𝛾−(1−𝛾)𝛽
. 
It can be shown that 𝑃𝑇
∗ = 1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2−𝛾
 for 𝑆𝐶 < 1. 
Second, I turn to the case 𝑆𝐶 = 1, where multiple equilibria exist. I look for the equilibrium 
that generates the highest revenue for the firm.17 When 𝑆𝐶 = 1, the equilibrium resale price depends on 
the sales in the first period. If the firm sells to its full capacity 1, then the resale price will be 𝑝 =
1+𝛽
2
 
since there will be equal amounts of buyers and sellers in the secondary market. Then, following the 
same procedure as in the derivation of Table 5, I obtain the demand function 𝑄(𝑃𝑇) =
2(1−𝑃𝑇)
1−𝛽
. To sell 
up to the full capacity, the firm has to charge 𝑃𝑇 =
1+𝛽
2 
. The resulting revenue is 𝜋𝑇 =
1+𝛽
2 
. 
If instead the firm sells less than its full capacity 1, the resale price will be 
1+(1−𝛾)𝛽
2−𝛾
, since there 
will be fewer sellers than buyers in the secondary market. Then, the demand function is 𝑄(𝑃𝑇) =
(2−𝛾)(1−𝑃𝑇)
1−𝛾−(1−𝛾)𝛽
, which leads to 𝑃𝑇
∗ = 1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2−𝛾
. As long as 𝑃𝑇 > 1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2−𝛾
, the demand will be 
smaller than capacity. Thus, the highest possible revenue occurs when 𝑃𝑇  is close to but still greater 
than 1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2−𝛾
. As a result, 𝜋𝑇
∗ = lim
𝑃→1−
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2−𝛾
(2−𝛾)(1−𝑃)
1−𝛾−(1−𝛾)𝛽
𝑃 = 1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2−𝛾
. 
Third, I turn to the case that 𝑆𝐶 > 1. When 𝑆𝐶 > 1, the firm faces two possible pricing schemes. 
First, the firm can charge a high price to serve a few consumers so that the resale price stays high as if 
                                                      
17 my key qualitative conclusion still holds for other equilibria.  
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𝑆𝐶 ≤ 1. Second, the firm can charge a low price to sell more than one tickets. To solve for the second 
scheme, I obtain the demand function 𝑄(𝑃) = 1 +
𝑝−𝑃
𝑝−𝛽
 for 𝑆𝐶 > 1. For 𝑆𝐶 > 1, , there will be fewer 
buyers than sellers in the secondary market regardless of which state (𝐴 or 𝐵) occurs. According to 
Lemma 1, the resale price is 
1−𝛾+𝛽
2−𝛾
. Given this resale price, the demand function can be rewritten as 
𝑄(𝑃) = 2 −
(2−𝛾)(𝑃−𝛽)
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
, with the profit function being 𝜋(𝑃) = (2 −
(2−𝛾)(𝑃−𝛽)
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
)𝑃. The optimal price 
turns to be 𝑃 = 1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
 if 𝑆𝐶 <
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
 and 𝑃 =
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾
2(2−𝛾)
 otherwise. That leads to a 
revenue of (1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 if 𝑆𝐶 <
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
 and 
(2−(2−𝛽)𝛾)2
4(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)(2−𝛾)
 otherwise.  
Now, let me compare the revenue generated from the two schemes. The first scheme generates 
1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2−𝛾
, while the second scheme generates 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {(1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶,
(2−(2−𝛽)𝛾)2
4(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)(2−𝛾)
}. 
When 𝛾 > 𝛾, then the first scheme generates higher revenue for any 𝑆𝐶 ∈ [1, 2]. Within this range, the 
firm targets only the high valuation segment. When 𝛽 ≥
1−2γ−3𝜌+3𝛾𝜌
−1−𝛾−3𝜌+3𝛾𝜌
, then the first (or second) scheme 
generates higher revenue for 𝑆𝐶 <
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾−√𝛽2(4−8𝛾+5𝛾2)+(8𝛽−4)(1−𝛾)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
 (or 𝑆𝐶 ≥
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾−√𝛽2(4−8𝛾+5𝛾2)+(8𝛽−4)(1−𝛾)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
). Thus, the firm chooses to sell less than one tickets if 𝑆𝐶 <
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾−√𝛽2(4−8𝛾+5𝛾2)+(8𝛽−4)(1−𝛾)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
 and sells more than one tickets otherwise. 
 
Appendix 10. Derivation of the Results in Table 8 “Contingency Selling with Decentralized 
Secondary Market” 
Without loss of generality I take the example of 𝐴 ticket. I give the solution to the contingency 
selling case in two steps. I first look at the case 𝑆𝐶 < 1 − 𝑝𝐴. When 𝑆𝐶 < 1 − 𝑝𝐴, one can use the logic 
akin to “Derivation of Results in Table 6” to show that all the 𝐴 tickets go to segment 1 consumers, and 
no resale happens in the secondary market. Thus, the optimal price(s) are the same as those in the Table 
6 (𝑃𝐴 = 1 − 𝑆𝐶).  
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Second, I turn to the case 1 − 𝑝𝐴 ≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1. Within this range, the firm sells the contingent 
tickets of each type to both consumer segments, while knowing that the will be more buyers more sellers 
in the secondary market. As shown in “Derivation of Results in Table 6”, the profit function is thus 
𝜋(𝑃𝐴) = (1 + 𝑝𝐴 − 2𝑃𝐴)𝑃𝐴 . Since 𝑆𝐶 < 1, I have 𝑝𝐴 =
1+(1−𝛾)𝛽
2−𝛾
 and rewrite the profit function as 
𝜋(𝑃𝐴) = (1 +
1+(1−𝛾)𝛽
2−𝛾
− 2𝑃𝐴) 𝑃𝐴 . The optimal price is 𝑃𝐴 =
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
4−2𝛾
−
𝑆𝐶
2
 if 𝑆𝐶 <
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
2(2−𝛾)
 and 
𝑃𝐴 =
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
4(2−𝛾)
 otherwise. Within the range 1 − 𝑝𝐴  ≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1, the highest 𝜋𝐴 is 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
8(2−𝛾)2
. 
Finally, I show the firm cannot earn more than 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
8(2−𝛾)2
 if it sells more than one 𝐴 tickets. 
I know that when the firm sells more than one tickets, the profit function takes the following form. 
𝜋𝐴(𝑃𝐴) =
(
 
3𝛽𝑝𝐴 − 𝑃𝐴(𝛽 + 2𝑝𝐴) + √4𝑃𝐴𝑝𝐴(𝑝𝐴 − 𝛽)𝛽 + (𝑝𝐴𝛽 + 𝑃𝐴(𝛽 − 2𝑝𝐴))
2
2𝛽𝑝𝐴
)
 𝑃𝐴 
𝜋𝐴(𝑃𝐴) is increasing in 𝑝, for 𝑝 ∈ [0,
1+𝛽
2
]. It means for any 𝑃𝐴 value, the highest revenue is 
achieved when 𝑝 =
1+𝛽
2
. Note that when 𝑝 =
1+𝛽
2
, the model is identical to the previous case with 
neutral resale price, where the maximal 𝜋𝐴  is 
(3+𝛽)2
32
. Since 
(3+𝛽)2
32
≤
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
8(2−𝛾)2
, I know the firm 
cannot earn more than 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
8(2−𝛾)2
 by selling more than one 𝐴 tickets. 
To summarize, the optimal price for ticket 𝐴  is 𝑃𝐴 = 1 − 𝑆𝐶  for 𝑆𝐶 <
1−𝛽−𝛾+𝛽𝛾
2−𝛾
, 𝑃𝐴 =
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
4−2𝛾
−
𝑆𝐶
2
 for 
1−𝛽−𝛾+𝛽𝛾
2−𝛾
≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
2(2−𝛾)
, and 𝑃𝐴 =
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
4(2−𝛾)
 for 𝑆𝐶 ≥
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
2(2−𝛾)
. In the 
similar fashion, the optimal price for ticket 𝐵 can be obtained. 
 
Appendix 11. Proof of Proposition 1.4 
First, I show that contingency selling always outperforms traditional selling for 𝑆𝐶 < 1 . 
Specifically, when 𝑆𝐶 <
1−𝛽−𝛾+𝛽𝛾
2−𝛾
, the contingency selling revenue is 2𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑆𝐶) , while the 
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traditional selling revenue is (1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 . The former is higher than the latter for 𝑆𝐶 <
1−𝛽−𝛾+𝛽𝛾
2−𝛾
. When 
1−𝛽−𝛾+𝛽𝛾
2−𝛾
≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
3+𝛽−2𝛾
4−2γ
, the contingency selling revenue is 𝑆𝐶 (
3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾
2−1𝛾
− 𝑆𝐶), 
while the traditional selling revenue is (1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2−𝛾
)𝑆𝐶. The former is higher than the latter for 
1−𝛽−𝛾+𝛽𝛾
2−𝛾
≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
3+𝛽−2𝛾
4−2γ
. When 
3+𝛽−2𝛾
4−2γ
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1, the contingency selling revenue is 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
4(2−𝛾)2
, 
while the traditional selling revenue is (1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶
2−𝛾
)𝑆𝐶. The former is higher than the latter for 
3+𝛽−2𝛾
4−2γ
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1. 
Second, I turn to the case 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 1. Under contingency selling, the revenue is 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
4(2−𝛾)2
. 
Under traditional selling, the revenue depends on the values of parameters 𝛾 and 𝛽. When 𝛾 > 𝛾, the 
traditional selling revenue is 1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2−𝛾
, which is lower than the contingency selling revenue. 
When 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾, the traditional selling revenue is 1 −
(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
2−𝛾
 for 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆?̃?. As I show in the 
previous paragraph, this revenue is lower than the contingency selling revenue. When 𝑆?̃? ≤ 𝑆𝐶 <
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
, the traditional selling revenue is (1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 . The comparison between 
traditional selling and contingency selling again depends on the values of parameters 𝛾 and 𝛽. 
When 𝛽 < √5 − 2, the contingency selling revenue is always higher than the traditional selling 
revenue. When 𝛽 ≥
1
2
, if 𝑆𝐶 is smaller (greater) than 𝑆?̂?, the contingency selling revenue 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
4(2−𝛾)2
 
is higher (lower) than (1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 . It can be verified that 𝑆?̂?  lies in the range 
[1,
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
]. When 5 − 2√6 ≤ 𝛽 <
1
2
, if 𝑆𝐶 is smaller (greater) than 𝑆?̂? and 𝛾 < ?̂? =
3−4√2𝛽+𝛽
1−2√2𝛽+𝛽
, 
the contingency selling revenue 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
4(2−𝛾)2
 is higher (lower) than (1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶. It can 
be verified that 𝑆?̂? lies in the range [1,
2−(2−𝛽)𝛾
2(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)
] for 𝛾 < ?̂?.  
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For √5 − 2 ≤ 𝛽 < 5 − 2√6, I prove that there exists a ?̂? such that if 𝑆𝐶 is smaller (greater) 
than 𝑆?̂?  and 𝛾 < ?̂? , the contingency selling revenue 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
4(2−𝛾)2
 is higher (lower) than (1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶. When √5 − 2 ≤ 𝛽 < 5 − 2√6 and 𝛾 >
2−4𝛽
2−3𝛽
, the traditional selling revenue is 
(1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 for 𝑆𝐶 ∈ (1, 2]. It can be checked that the contingency revenue 
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
4(2−𝛾)2
 
is higher than (1 −
(1−𝛽)((1−𝛾)𝑆𝐶+𝛾)
2−𝛾
) 𝑆𝐶 for 𝑆𝐶 ∈ (1, 2]. When √5 − 2 ≤ 𝛽 < 5 − 2√6 and 𝛾 ≤
2−4𝛽
2−3𝛽
, 
the highest traditional selling revenue is 
(2−(2−𝛽)𝛾)2
4(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)(2−𝛾)
 for 𝑆𝐶 ∈ (1, 2] . Thus, the difference 
contingency selling revenue and (highest) traditional selling revenue is ∆=
(3+𝛽−𝛾−𝛽𝛾)2
4(2−𝛾)2
−
(2−(2−𝛽)𝛾)2
4(1−𝛽)(1−𝛾)(2−𝛾)
. It can be verified that ∆ is positive at 𝛾 =
2−4𝛽
2−3𝛽
 and negative at 𝛾 = 0. By checking 
the sign of the first order derivative, I obtain that ∆ is increasing in 𝛾 for 𝛾 ∈ [0,
2−4𝛽
2−3𝛽
]. Thus, there must 
exist a ?̂? ∈ [0,
2−4𝛽
2−3𝛽
] so that ∆= 0 at ?̂?. For 𝛾 ≥ ?̂?, contingency selling always generate higher revenue. 
For 𝛾 < ?̂?, contingency selling revenue is higher (lower) than traditional selling revenue if 𝑆𝐶 is smaller 
(greater) than 𝑆?̂?. 
In summary, contingency selling always generates higher revenue than traditional selling if 
𝛽 < √5 − 2 or 𝛾 ≥ ?̂? . If 𝛽 ≥ √5 − 2 and 𝛾 < ?̂? , contingency selling (traditional selling) generates 
higher revenue if 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆?̂? (𝑆𝐶 ≥ 𝑆?̂?).  
 
Appendix 12. Proof of Proposition 1.5 
First, it is easy to see check that, for 𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
, contingency selling outperforms spot selling since 
𝜋𝐶 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {2𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝑆𝐶),
2𝛽𝑆𝐶(2−𝑆𝐶)
1+𝛽
} > 𝜋𝑆 = 𝑆𝐶 for 𝑆𝐶 <
1
2
. Second, I turn to the case 
1
2
≤ 𝑆𝐶 < 1, 
where 𝜋𝐶 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {
1
2
,
2𝛽𝑆𝐶(2−𝑆𝐶)
1+𝛽
} and 𝜋𝑆 = 𝑆𝐶. For 𝛽 <
1
2
, 𝜋𝐶 < 𝜋𝑆. For 𝛽 ≥
1
2
, 𝜋𝐶  is greater (smaller) 
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than 𝜋𝑆  if 𝑆𝐶 <
3
2
−
1
2𝛽
 (𝑆𝐶 ≥
3
2
−
1
2𝛽
). Third, for 𝑆𝐶 ≥ 1, 𝜋𝐶 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {
1
2
,
2𝛽
1+𝛽
}  is always lower than 
𝜋𝑆 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{1, 𝛽𝑆𝐶}. In summary, Proposition 5 is proved.  
 
Appendix 13. Derivation of equilibrium with Ticket Option 
When the firm sells ticket options, it sets an option price 𝑃𝑂 and an exercise price 𝑃𝐸 . The firm 
sells ticket options in the first stage when the state is uncertainty. Consumers can choose to purchase 
the option at 𝑃𝑂. In the second stage, the true state of the world (𝐴 or 𝐵) is realized. Consumers who 
have bought the option in the first period has the right to exercise the option by paying 𝑃𝐸 . 
Whether a consumer chooses to exercise her option depends on both the value of 𝑃𝐸  and the 
realized state. When 𝑃𝐸 > 𝛽, a consumer is only willing to exercise the option if her preferred state is 
realized. When 𝑃𝐸 ≤ 𝛽, a consumer is willing to exercise the option regardless of the realized state. I 
solve for the optimal pricing strategies in these two conditions respectively.  
We first analyze the case 𝑃𝐸 ≤ 𝛽, where all the consumers anticipate that they will exercise the 
option in either state. For a consumer 𝑖 in segment 1, her valuation for the option takes the following 
form. 
𝜌𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝐸) + (1 − 𝜌𝑖)(𝛽 − 𝑃𝐸) 
Since 𝜌𝑖 follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1], the segment 1 consumers’ valuations follow 
the uniform distribution on [𝛽 − 𝑃𝐸 , 1 − 𝑃𝐸 ]. Similarly, I can show that the segment 2 consumers’ 
valuations also follow the uniform distribution on [𝛽 − 𝑃𝐸 , 1 − 𝑃𝐸]. These two consumer segments 
jointly generate the following aggregate demand function. 
𝑄(𝑃𝑂) =
{
 
 
2, 𝑃𝑂 < 𝛽 − 𝑃𝐸
2(1 − 𝑃𝑂 − 𝑃𝐸)
1 − 𝛽
, 𝛽 − 𝑃𝐸 ≤ 𝑃𝑂 < 1 − 𝑃𝐸
0, 𝑃𝑂 ≥ 1 − 𝑃𝐸
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Since all the consumers who purchase the option will exercise it in either state, the margin for 
the firm is 𝑃𝑂 + 𝑃𝐸 . The above demand function can be rewritten as follow. 
𝑄(𝑃𝑂 + 𝑃𝐸) =
{
 
 
2, 𝑃𝑂 + 𝑃𝐸 < 𝛽
2(1 − 𝑃𝑂 − 𝑃𝐸)
1 − 𝛽
, 𝛽 ≤ 𝑃𝑂 + 𝑃𝐸 < 1
0, 𝑃𝑂 + 𝑃𝐸 ≥ 1
 
Note that this demand function is identical to the one under traditional selling in the main model. 
Following the same logic, I can obtain the same solution as in traditional selling. 
Second, I turn to the case 𝑃𝐸 > 𝛽. When 𝑃𝐸 > 𝛽, a consumer is only willing to exercise the 
option in her preferred state. For a consumer 𝑖 in segment 1, her valuation for the option takes the 
following form.  
𝜌𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝐸) 
Since 𝜌𝑖 follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1], segment 1 consumers’ valuations follow the 
uniform distribution on [0, 1 − 𝑃𝐸]. Similarly, I can show that segment 2 consumers’ valuations also 
follow the uniform distribution on [0, 1 − 𝑃𝐸]. These two consumer segments jointly generate the 
following aggregate demand function. 
𝑄(𝑃𝑂) = {
2 −
2𝑃𝑂
1 − 𝑃𝐸
, 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑂 < 1 − 𝑃𝐸
0, 𝑃𝑂 ≥ 1 − 𝑃𝐸
 
Since the two segments are symmetric, the demands generated in the two segments should also 
be the same, given any price. Thus, only half of the consumers with the option will exercise it in a 
particular state. In total, the firm’s margin per option would be 𝑃𝑂 +
𝑃𝐸
2
. The revenue function takes the 
following form. 
𝜋(𝑃𝑂, 𝑃𝐸) = {
(2 −
2𝑃𝑂
1 − 𝑃𝐸
) ( 𝑃𝑂 +
𝑃𝐸
2
) , 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑂 < 1 − 𝑃𝐸
0, 𝑃𝑂 ≥ 1 − 𝑃𝐸
 
The firm chooses 𝑃𝑂 and 𝑃𝐸  to maximize its revenue subject to the following constraint. 
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{
𝑃𝐸 > 𝛽
2 −
2𝑃𝑂
1 − 𝑃𝐸
≤ 𝑆𝐶
 
When 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 1, the optimal option price 𝑃𝑂 given exercise price 𝑃𝐸  is 
1
2
(1 − 𝑃𝐸)(2 − 𝑆𝐶). If I 
let 𝑃𝑂 be 
1
2
(1 − 𝑃𝐸)(2 − 𝑆𝐶), the revenue function can be rewritten as 
𝜋(𝑃𝐸) =
1
2
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶 − 𝑃𝐸(1 − 𝑆𝐶)) 
The revenue is decreasing in 𝑃𝐸  for 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 1. Thus, I obtain the following inequality. 
𝜋(𝑃𝐸) < 𝜋(𝛽) =
1
2
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝛽 − 𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽)) 
Note that this revenue is lower than the revenue in the case 𝑃𝐸 ≤ 𝛽 , which is 
1
2
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽)). Thus, the firm won’t set 𝑃𝐸  higher than 𝛽, when 𝑆𝐶 ≤ 1. 
When 𝑆𝐶 > 1, the optimal option price 𝑃𝑂  given exercise price 𝑃𝐸  is 
1
2
(1 − 𝑃𝐸)(2 − 𝑆𝐶) if 
𝑆𝐶 <
2−𝑃𝐸
2(1−𝑃𝐸)
 and 
1
4
(2 − 3𝑃𝐸)  otherwise. In the former scenario, the revenue is 
1
2
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶 −
𝑃𝐸(1 − 𝑆𝐶)), while the revenue is 
(2−𝑃𝐸)
2
8(1−𝑃𝐸)
 in the latter scenario. In can be checked that both expression 
is increasing in 𝑃𝐸  for 𝑆𝐶 > 1. Thus, the optimal exercise price is 𝑃𝐸 = 1, which makes 𝑆𝐶 <
2−𝑃𝐸
2(1−𝑃𝐸)
 
always hold. The corresponding option price is 𝑃𝑂 = 0. The revenue is 
1
2
𝑆𝐶. Note that the revenue in 
case 𝑃𝐸 ≤ 𝛽 is 
1
2
𝑆𝐶(2 − 𝑆𝐶(1 − 𝛽)) for 𝑆𝐶 <
1
1−𝛽
 and 
1
2(1−𝛽)
 otherwise. In comparison, I obtain that 
1
2
𝑆𝐶 is higher than the revenue in case 𝑃𝐸 ≤ 𝛽 if 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
1−𝛽
 and 𝛽 ≤
1
2
.  
In summary, when 𝛽 >
1
2
 or 𝑆𝐶 <
1
1−𝛽
, the firm sets 𝑃𝑂 + 𝑃𝐸 = 1 −
𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽)
2
 and earns a 
revenue 
𝑆𝐶(2−𝑆𝐶(1−𝛽))
2
. When 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
1−𝛽
 and 𝛽 ≤
1
2
, the firm sets 𝑃𝑂 = 0 and 𝑃𝐸 = 1, and the revenue 
is 
1
2
𝑆𝐶. 
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Finally, I compare the ticket option with contingency selling. It turns out that contingency 
selling generates higher (lower) revenue than ticket option if 𝑆𝐶 < 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  (𝑆𝐶 ≥ 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅ ). The threshold 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  is 
identical to the threshold in Proposition 2. This is because, the ticket option revenue is identical to 
traditional selling for 𝛽 >
1
2
 or 𝑆𝐶 <
1
1−𝛽
, and the threshold 𝑆𝐶̅̅̅̅  lies in the range [0,
1
1−𝛽
]. When 𝑆𝐶 ≥
1
1−𝛽
 and 𝛽 ≤
1
2
, contingency selling revenue is lower than the traditional selling revenue, which is even 
lower than the ticket option revenue.  
Overall, contingency selling outperforms ticket option for low service capacity.  
 
Appendix 14. Derivation of the Entrepreneur’s strategy for the full model 
In this appendix, I solve for the entrepreneur’s optimal advertising, quality, and price strategies 
for the full model. All the other scenarios in the paper can be viewed as modifications of the full model 
here.  
First, I look at the traditional scenario. The entrepreneur’s profit function is 𝜋𝑇(𝑆𝑇, 𝐾𝑇 , 𝑃𝑇) =
𝐾𝑇𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝑇
𝑆𝑇
) 𝑃𝑇 − 𝐶(𝑆𝑇) − 𝑎𝑑(𝐾𝑇) with uncertain 𝑀 . The expected profit is 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝑆𝑇, 𝐾𝑇 , 𝑃𝑇)] =
1
2
𝐾𝑇 (1 −
𝑃𝑇
𝑆𝑇
)𝑃𝑇 − 𝐶(𝑆𝑇) − 𝑎𝑑(𝐾𝑇). Facing such profit function, the entrepreneur chooses 𝐾𝑇, 𝑆𝑇, and 
𝑃𝑇  sequentially. 
By differentiating 𝜋𝑇(𝑆𝑇 , 𝐾𝑇 , 𝑃𝑇) with respect to 𝑃𝑇  and setting the derivative to zero, I obtain 
the optimal price is 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
𝑆𝑇
2
. By plugging in 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
𝑆𝑇
2
, 𝐶(𝑆𝑇) =
𝑆𝑇
2
2
, and 𝑎𝑑(𝐾𝑇) =
𝐾𝑇
3
24
, the expected 
profit function can be rewritten as 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝑆𝑇 , 𝐾𝑇)] =
𝐾𝑇𝑆𝑇
8
−
𝑆𝑇
2
2
−
𝐾𝑇
3
24
. 
We differentiate the profit expectation with respect to 𝑆𝑇 to obtain the first order condition, 
 
𝐾𝑇
8
− 𝑆𝑇 = 0. Obviously, the optimal quality is 𝑆𝑇
∗ =
𝐾𝑇
8
. By plugging in 𝑆𝑇
∗ =
𝐾𝑇
8
, I rewrite the profit 
expectation as 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝐾𝑇)] =
𝐾𝑇
2
128
−
𝐾𝑇
3
24
. By differentiating this expression with respect to 𝐾𝑇, I reach 
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the first order condition, 
𝐾𝑇
64
−
𝐾𝑇
2
8
= 0. There are two solutions to this condition, 𝐾𝑇 = 0 and 𝐾𝑇 =
1
8
. 
The one that also satisfies the second order condition is 𝐾𝑇
∗ =
1
8
. 
Second, I turn into the crowdfunding scenario, where the entrepreneur’s profit function is given 
as follows.  
𝜋𝐶(𝑆𝐶 , 𝐾𝐶, 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺) =
{
 
 
 
 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆𝐶
)𝑃𝐶 −
𝑆𝐶
2
2
−
𝐾𝐶
3
24
, 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆𝐶
)𝑃𝐶 ≥ 𝐺
0 −
𝐾𝐶
3
24
, 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆𝐶
)𝑃𝐶 < 𝐺
 
Since 𝑀 follows [0, 1] uniform distribution, the entrepreneur’s expected profit can be written 
as 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆𝐶 , 𝐾𝐶, 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺)] = (1 −
𝐺𝑆𝐶
𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝐶−𝑃𝐶)
)
𝐺𝑆𝐶−𝑆𝐶
3+𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝐶−𝑃𝐶)
2𝑆𝐶
−
𝐾𝐶
3
24
. 
By differentiating the above expression with respect to 𝐺 and setting the derivative to zero, I 
obtain the optimal funding goal 𝐺∗ =
𝑆𝐶
2
2
. I then substitute 𝐺∗ =
𝑆𝐶
2
2
 and obtain 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆𝐶 , 𝐾𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶)] =
𝐺𝑆𝐶(2𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝐶−𝑃𝐶)+𝑆𝐶
3)
2
8𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐶(𝑆𝐶−𝑃𝐶)
−
𝐾𝐶
3
24
. 
By differentiating the above expression with respect to 𝑃𝐶  and setting the derivative to zero, I 
obtain the optimal price 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
𝑆𝐶
2
. Then, I rewrite the expected profit as 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆𝐶 , 𝐾𝐶)] =
1
8𝐾𝐶
(𝐾𝐶 − 2𝑆𝐶)
2𝑆𝐶 −
𝐾𝐶
3
24
. 
We then differentiate it with respect to 𝑆𝐶  to obtain the first order condition 
(𝐾𝐶−6𝑆𝐶)(𝐾𝐶−2𝑆𝐶)
8𝐾𝐶
=
0. There are two 𝑆𝐶  values that satisfy this condition. By checking the second order condition, I obtain 
the optimal quality level 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
𝐾𝐶
6
. Now I can rewrite the profit expectation as 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝐾𝐶)] =
𝐾𝐶
2
108
−
𝐾𝐶
3
24
. 
I differentiate this expression with respect to 𝐾𝐶  and get the first order condition, 
𝐾𝐶
54
−
𝐾𝐶
2
8
= 0. There 
are solutions to this condition, 𝐾𝐶 = 0  and 𝐾𝐶 =
4
27
. The one that also satisfies the second order 
condition is 𝐾𝐶
∗ =
4
27
. 
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Appendix 15. Proof of Proposition 2.1 
In this appendix, I solve for the entrepreneur’s optimal quality and price strategy in the base 
model. The model here can be viewed as a special case of the full model in Chapter 2 Section 5, with 
the modification that the advertising is cost free. When advertising is costless, the entrepreneur will 
choose the maximal possible advertising level 𝐾𝑇
∗ = 𝐾𝐶
∗ = 1  in both the traditional and the 
crowdfunding entry model. Following the manner of Appendix 14, I can derive the entrepreneur’s 
optimal strategies in the traditional scenario and crowdfunding. 
In the traditional scenario, the optimal product quality, price, and the profit expectation are 
respectively 𝑆𝑇
∗ =
1
8
, 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
1
16
, and 𝐸[𝜋𝑇
∗ ] =
1
128
. 
In crowdfunding, the optimal product quality, price, funding goal, and the profit expectation 
are respectively 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
1
6
, 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
1
12
, 𝐺∗ =
1
72
, and 𝐸[𝜋𝐶
∗] =
1
108
. 
Finally, I compare the product quality, price, and expected profit in the traditional vs. 
crowdfunding scenarios. It is clear that 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
1
6
> 𝑆𝑇
∗ =
1
8
, 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
1
12
> 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
1
16
, and 𝐸[𝜋𝐶
∗] =
1
108
>
𝐸[𝜋𝑇
∗ ] =
1
128
. Proposition 1 is proved. 
 
Appendix 16. Derivation of Equation (8) and (9) 
In this appendix, I solve for the optimal advertising level for a fixed quality level 𝑆̅. The model 
here is similar to the full model in Appendix 14 expect that both 𝑆𝑇 and 𝑆𝐶  are fixed at 𝑆̅.  
First, I look at the traditional scenario. Following the same fashion of Appendix 14, I obtain the 
optimal price 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
𝑆̅
2
 and rewrite the profit expectation as 𝐸[𝜋𝑇(𝑆̅, 𝐾𝑇)] =
𝐾𝑇𝑆̅
8
−
𝑆̅2
2
−
𝐾𝑇
3
24
. I 
differentiate the profit expectation with respect to 𝐾𝑇 to obtain the first order condition,  
𝑆̅
8
=
𝐾𝑇
2
8
. It 
follows that the optimal advertising level 𝐾𝑇
∗ = √𝑆.̅ Equation (8) is derived. 
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Second, I turn into the crowdfunding scenario, where the entrepreneur’s expected profit can be 
written as 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆̅, 𝐾𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺)] = (1 −
𝐺𝑆̅
𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑆̅−𝑃𝐶)
)
𝐺𝑆̅−𝑆̅3+𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑆̅−𝑃𝐶)
2𝑆̅
−
𝐾𝐶
3
24
. Following the procedure 
in Appendix 14, I obtain the optimal funding goal 𝐺∗ =
𝑆̅2
2
 and price 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
𝑆̅
2
. Then, I rewrite the 
expected profit as 𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆̅, 𝐾𝐶)] =
1
8𝐾𝐶
(𝐾𝐶 − 2𝑆̅)
2𝑆̅ −
𝐾𝐶
3
24
. 
By differentiating this expression with respect to 𝐾𝐶 , I get the following first order condition, 
−𝐾𝐶
4+𝐾𝐶
2𝑆̅−4𝑆̅3
8𝐾𝐶
2 = 0 . There exist two real-value solutions that satisfy this condition, 𝐾𝐶 =
√
1
2
𝑆̅ (1 − √1 − 16𝑆̅) and 𝐾𝐶 = √
1
2
𝑆̅ (1 + √1 − 16𝑆̅). By checking the second order condition, I get 
𝐾𝐶
∗ = √
1
2
𝑆̅ (1 + √1 − 16𝑆̅). Equation (9) is derived. 
 
Appendix 17. Proof of Proposition 2.2 
The proof of Proposition 2.2 comes directly from the comparison of 𝐾𝑇
∗  and 𝐾𝐶
∗  shown in 
Appendix 14. It is straightforward to see that 𝐾𝑇
∗ =
1
8
< 𝐾𝐶
∗ =
4
27
. is proved. 
 
Appendix 18. Proof of Proposition 2.3 
In the traditional scenario, the expected consumer surplus takes the following form. 
𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑇(𝐾𝑇 , 𝑆𝑇 , 𝑃𝑇)] = ∫ ∫ 𝐾𝑇𝑀(𝜃𝑆𝑇 − 𝑃𝑇)𝑑𝜃
1
𝑃𝑇
𝑆𝑇
𝑑𝑀
1
0
 
We know that 𝑃𝑇
∗ =
1
128
, 𝑆𝑇
∗ =
1
64
, 𝐾𝑇
∗ =
1
8
, and 𝜃 follows the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. 
Thus, I can calculate the expected consumer surplus 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑇] =
1
8192
. 
In crowdfunding, the consumer surplus depends on whether the project is funded. 
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𝐶𝑆𝐶(𝐾𝐶 , 𝑆𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺, 𝑀) =
{
 
 
 
 𝐾𝐶𝑀∫ (𝜃𝑆𝐶 − 𝑃𝐶) 𝑑𝜃
1
𝑃𝐶
𝑆𝐶
, 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆𝐶
)𝑃𝐶 ≥ 𝐺
0, 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑆𝐶
)𝑃𝐶 < 𝐺
 
By plugging in 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
1
81
, 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
2
81
, 𝐾𝐶
∗ =
4
27
, and 𝐺∗ =
2
6561
, I can rewrite the formula. 
𝐶𝑆𝐶(𝑀) =
{
 
 
 
 4
27
𝑀∫ (
2𝜃
81
−
1
81
)𝑑𝜃
1
1
2
, 𝑀 ≥
1
3
0, 𝑀 <
1
3
 
Since 𝜃 is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], I can further simplify the expression. 
𝐶𝑆𝐶(𝑀) = {
𝑀
2187
, 𝑀 ≥
1
3
0, 𝑀 <
1
3
 
Thus, the expected consumer surplus is 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝐶] =
4
19683
. By comparison, I conclude that 
𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝐶] > 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝑇].  
 
Appendix 19. Proof of Proposition 2.4 
First, it is easy to see that the entrepreneur’s in the traditional scenario does not vary with 
respect to 𝛽. This is because the entrepreneur’s expected profit only depends on the expected 𝑀 which 
remains still. 
Second, let me examine the crowdfunding scenario, where the entrepreneur’s profit function is 
the same as in the main model. The only difference here is that 𝑀 follows the uniformly distribution 
over [
1
2
− 𝛽,
1
2
+ 𝛽]. As a result, the entrepreneur’s expected profit can be written as 
𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝑆𝐶 , 𝐾𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺)] = (
1
2
+ 𝛽 −
𝐺𝑆𝐶
𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝐶 − 𝑃𝐶)
)
2𝑆𝐶(𝐺 − 𝑆𝐶
2) + (1 + 2𝛽)𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑆𝐶 − 𝑃𝐶)
8𝛽𝑆𝐶
−
𝐾𝐶
3
24
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Similar to Appendix 14, I obtain 𝐾𝐶
∗ =
1
108𝛽
(1 + 2𝛽)3 , 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
1
1296𝛽
(1 + 2𝛽)4 , 𝑃𝐶
∗ =
1
2592𝛽
(1 + 2𝛽)4, and 𝐸[𝜋𝐶] =
(1+2𝛽)9
6(216𝛽)3
. Following the procedure in Appendix 18, I can also calculate 
the expected consumer surplus 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝐶] =
(1+2𝛽)9
6718464𝛽3
. It is easy to check that 𝑆𝐶
∗ , 𝑃𝐶
∗, 𝐾𝐶
∗, 𝐸[𝜋𝐶], and 
𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝐶] are all increasing in 𝛽. 
 
Appendix 20. Proof of Proposition 2.5 
Here, I solve for the entrepreneur’s optimal strategies in crowdfunding. Since the quality 
preference 𝜃 is uniformly distributed over [0, 𝑎], the demand function can be written as 𝐷(𝑆𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶) =
𝑀𝐾𝐶 (1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑎𝑆𝐶
). Correspondingly, the profit for the entrepreneur is given as follows.  
𝜋𝐶(𝐾𝐶 , 𝑆𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺) =
{
 
 
 
 𝑀𝐾𝐶 (1 −
𝑃𝐶
𝑎𝑆𝐶
)𝑃 −
𝑆𝐶
2
2
− 𝑎𝑑(𝐾𝐶), 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1−
𝑃𝐶
𝑎𝑆𝐶
)𝑃𝐶 ≥ 𝐺
0 − 𝑎𝑑(𝐾𝐶), 𝐾𝐶𝑀(1−
𝑃𝐶
𝑎𝑆𝐶
)𝑃𝐶 < 𝐺
 
Given the distribution of 𝑀, I can derive the entrepreneur’s expected profit. 
𝐸[𝜋𝐶(𝐾𝐶 , 𝑆𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐺)] = (1 −
𝑎𝐺𝑆𝐶
𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑎𝑆𝐶 − 𝑃𝐶)
)
𝐾𝐶𝑃𝐶(𝑎𝑆𝐶 − 𝑃𝐶) + 𝑎𝑆𝐶(𝐺 − 𝑆𝐶
2)
2𝑎𝑆𝐶
 
By equating the first order derivative to zero, I obtain the optimal funding goal 𝐺∗ =
2𝑎6
6561
, price 
𝑃𝐶
∗ =
𝑎4
81
, product quality 𝑆𝐶
∗ =
2𝑎3
81
, and advertising level 𝐾𝐶
∗ =
4𝑎2
27
. The expected profit is 
4𝑎6
59049
. 
Following the manner in Appendix 18, I obtain the expected consumer surplus crowdfunding 𝐸[𝐶𝑆𝐶] =
4𝑎7
19683
. 
When I compare these values to those in the traditional scenario, I find that the product quality 
is higher in crowdfunding than in the traditional scenario if 𝑎 ≥
3
4
(
3
2
)
1 3⁄
. The advertising level is higher 
in crowdfunding if 𝑎 ≥
3
2
(
1
8
)
1 4⁄
. The advertising level is higher in crowdfunding if 𝑎 ≥
3
4
(
3
2
)
1 2⁄
. The 
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expected consumer surplus is higher in crowdfunding if 𝑎 ≥
3
4
(
3
2
)
1 2⁄
≈ 0.919 . Proposition 2.5 is 
proved. 
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